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Abstract
We extend the constructive differential game logic (CdGL) of hybrid games with a refinement
connective that relates two hybrid games. In addition to CdGL’s ability to prove the existence of
winning strategies for specific postconditions of hybrid games, game refinements relate two games
themselves. That makes it possible to prove that any winning strategy for any postcondition of
one game carries over to a winning strategy for the other. Since CdGL is constructive, an effective
winning strategy can be extracted from a proof that a player wins a game. A folk theorem says that
such a winning strategy for a hybrid game has a corresponding hybrid system satisfying the same
property. We make this precise using CdGL’s game refinements and prove correct the construction
of hybrid systems from winning strategies of hybrid games.
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1 Introduction
Hybrid games combine discrete computation, continuous differential equations, and adversarial
dynamics, which makes them useful to study robust operation of cyber-physical systems
(CPS). CPSs such as transportation systems, medical devices, and power systems must
remain reliable even in adversarial environments. Differential Game Logic (dGL) [36] enables
formal proofs of properties such as safety and liveness for hybrid games. Theorems of dGL
answer: does a winning strategy exist for a given player to achieve a given postcondition
in a given game? A constructive version of dGL (CdGL) [8] ensures winning strategies of
games α are effective and thus implementable on a computer. This is a prerequisite for
proof-based synthesis of control and monitoring code, which can ensure implementation-level
correctness in a broader range of cases than synthesis approaches which do not use proofs.
Yet the state of the art of implementation for games synthesis remains far behind that for
hybrid systems (one-player games). For example, monitor synthesis with end-to-end safety
via verified compilation is supported [9] for systems only. The question arises: is there a
way to apply existing systems tools to games, or does games synthesis demand wholly new
implementation?
This paper shows the affirmative answer (in principle) by giving an inlining operation
which generates a hybrid system given a hybrid game and its winning strategy. The affirmative
answer may be surprising because games are known [36] to be more expressive than systems;
only once a winning strategy is known can we bridge this expressiveness gap. To prove
the correctness of inlining, we must be able to compare games (and their inlined systems)
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XX:2 Refining Constructive Hybrid Games
to one another, to which end we develop a refinement calculus for CdGL. We take this
general approach because refinements are also of broader interest. Comparison of games is a
fundamental operation with several motivations:
i) To our knowledge, the idea of “inlining” strategies into systems exists in folklore but has
not been shown formally. Refinement aids us in making this folklore concept rigorous.
ii) Differential refinement logic dRL [31] has reduced the human labor required for verification
of classical hybrid systems; we hope to do so for constructive hybrid games.
iii) Refinement may enable comparing the efficacy of two controllers: does one controller
always achieve its goal faster?
iv) Equivalences of programs play a fundamental role in KAT [29]. Equivalences directly
correspond to mutual refinements, which CdGL generalizes to games.
v) Inlining and refinement give an intensional view of strategy equality: two strategies are
“the same” if their inlining produces systems which refine each other equally.
vi) Differential game refinements in dGL [37] provide a relational reasoning technique for
differential games; we apply refinement ideas to hybrid games in CdGL.
The immediate aim of this paper is to enable translation from game proofs into systems, but
we believe a refinement calculus for CdGL will aid in all of the above.
Contributions
This paper extends two lines of work. The first line consists of constructive game logic [7, 8]
for discrete games (CGL) and hybrid games (CdGL), the second consists of classical refinement
reasoning for hybrid systems in dRL [31] and equalities for propositional discrete games [23].
Because GL’s are subnormal, adapting dRL rules to games is particularly subtle. We also
generalize propositional game equivalences [23] to be contextual, and generalize the semantic
foundations of CdGL [8] to support refinement. Even for rules which look the same as
prior work, our constructive semantics demand novel soundness proofs. Our contributions
culminate in an “inlining” operation which provably captures the winning strategy of a game
in a system.
In Section 2, we discuss additional related work. In Section 3, we recall the syntax of
CdGL, demonstrate the syntax with a toy example, and add a refinement connective. In
Section 4, we recall the semantics of CdGL, generalizing them to support refinement. In
Section 5, we give a calculus for CdGL refinements. In Section 6, we discuss theoretical results
about soundness and inlining. The paper concludes with Section 7.
2 Related Work
Related works include constructive modal logics, synthesis, and games in logic.
Games in Logic
Propositional GL was introduced by Parikh [35]. The first-order GL of hybrid games is
dGL [36]. GL formulas have been reduced to µ-calculus [35, 28] and game equivalences have
been reduced [23] to propositional modal logic. In contrast, we translate game logic proofs,
which lets us translate CdGL into a less expressive logical fragment.
GLs are unique in their clear delegation of strategy to the proof language rather than
the model language, allowing succinct, trustworthy game specifications with sophisticated
winning strategies. Relatives without this separation of concerns include SL [12], ATL [3],
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CATL [47], SDGL [22], structured strategies [40], DEL [44, 46, 43], evidence logic [45], and
Angelic Hoare Logic [33].
Constructive Modal Logics
The task of assigning a semantics to games should not be confused with game semantics [1],
which give a semantics to programs in terms of games. The main semantic approaches for
constructive modal logics are intuitionistic Kripke semantics [50] and realizability seman-
tics [48, 30]. We follow the type theoretic semantics which were introduced for CdGL [8].
Constructive (modal) program logics are less studied than classical ones. A few authors [7,
26] develop a Curry-Howard correspondence with proof terms, the latter for a simple fragment
of dynamic logic. Other works [51, 16, 11] address only fragments and do not explore Curry-
Howard in the same depth. In contrast to these, we support constructive refinement, which is
also of interest for constructive program logics generally. The discussion of proof terms here
is brief for the sake of space. Our treatment of constructive real arithmetic follows CdGL,
which follows Bishop [5, 10] using constructive formalizations [15, 32].
Hybrid Systems Synthesis
Synthesis for hybrid systems is an active research area. Fully automated synthesis relies on
restrictions such as simple fragments [27, 41] or discrete abstractions [20, 19]. ModelPlex [34]
exploits interactive safety proofs in dL [38], the systems fragment of dGL, for monitor synthesis.
Not only can proof-based synthesis synthesize every provable model, but it gives the user
more control: to generate a less restrictive monitor, simply revise the proof to use less
restrictive assumptions. ModelPlex supports an especially rigorous end-to-end verification
approach [9]. We aim to provide a reduction through which ModelPlex could support games.
Synthesis of high-level plans is also studied [4, 18].
3 Syntax
We recall the language of CdGL [8], consisting of terms, games, and formulas, and introduce
new connectives for game refinement formulas. Games are perfect-information, zero-sum,
and two-player. Take note of our terminology for players, which is particularly subtle for
constructive games. We use the name Angel for the player whose choices are quantified
existentially (“us”) and Demon for the player whose choices are quantified universally
(“them”). They alternate turns, and at any moment one player is active (making decisions)
while the opponent is dormant (waiting for their turn). In an unfortunate subtlety, a formula,
proof, refinement, etc. is called Angelic whenever it is existential and Demonic whenever it
is universal, regardless of which player is active. The simplest terms are (game) variables
x, y ∈ V where V is the set of variable identifiers. All variables are mutable and globally
scoped. Their values correspond to the state of the game. For every base game variable
x there is a primed counterpart x′ whose purpose is track the time-derivative of x within
an ODE. Variables range over uncountable real numbers, but all real-valued terms must be
computable functions. That is, real-valued terms f, g are (Type-2 [49]) effective functions,
usually from states to reals. Type-2 effectivity means f must be computable when the values
of variables are represented as streams of bits. It is occasionally useful for f to return a tuple
of reals, which are computable when every component is computable.
I Definition 1 (Terms). A term f, g is any computable function over the game state. The
XX:4 Refining Constructive Hybrid Games
following constructs appear in our example:
f, g ::= · · · | c | x | f + g | f · g | (f)′
where c ∈ R is a real literal, x a game variable, f + g a sum, and f · g a product. For
differentiable terms f, the total spatial differential term is written (f)′ and agrees with the
time derivative of f during an ODE.
Because CdGL is constructive, strategies must represent Angel’s choices computably. While
Demon is playing, Angel simply monitors whether Demon’s choices obey the rules of the
game, and does not care whether they were computable. We informally discuss how a game
is played here, then give full winning conditions in Section 4.
I Definition 2 (Games). The language of games α, β ∈ Game is defined recursively as such:
α, β ::= ?φ | x := f | x := ∗ | x′ = f &ψ | α ∪ β | α;β | α∗ | αd
The test game ?φ, is a no-op if the active player can present a proof of φ, else the dormant
player wins by default since the active player “broke the rules”. A deterministic assignment
x := f updates variable x to the value of term f . Nondeterministic assignments x := ∗ ask
the active player to compute the new value of x : R. The ODE game x′ = f &ψ evolves the
differential equation x′ = f for some duration d ≥ 0 chosen by the active player such that
the active player proves ψ throughout. We assume for simplicity that all terms f appearing
in differential equations are locally Lipschitz-continuous throughout the domain constraint.
ODEs are explicit-form, meaning that f and ψ do not mention any primed variables y′.
Except when otherwise stated, we present ODEs with a single equation x′ = f for the sake
of readability. In the choice game α∪ β, the active player chooses whether to play game α or
game β. In the sequential game α;β, game α is played first, then β from the resulting state
(unless a player broke the rules during α). In the repetition game α∗, the active player chooses
after each repetition of α whether to continue playing, but must not repeat α infinitely. The
exact number of iterations does not need to be computed in advance but can depend on
the opponent’s moves. In the dual game αd the active player takes the dormant role and
vice-versa, then α is played. We parenthesize games with braces {α} when necessary.
I Definition 3 (CdGL Formulas). The set of CdGL formulas φ (also ψ, ρ) is given recursively
by the grammar:
φ ::= 〈α〉φ | [α]φ | f ∼ g | α ≤ i[ ] β
for comparison predicates ∼ ∈{≤, <,=, 6=, >,≥}.
Modalities 〈α〉φ and [α]φ say Angel wins α with postcondition φ, starting as the active or
dormant player respectively. Modality 〈α〉φ is Angelic in the sense that decisions are resolved
Angelically: Angel is the one currently making choices. Modality [α]φ is Demonic in the
sense that decisions are resolved Demonically: Angel has no control until a dual operator
is encountered. We will deal mainly in box modalities [α]φ, with Angel’s moves appearing
inside dualities αd and Demon’s moves outside dualities.
Game refinements come in two standard [23] kinds: Angelic and Demonic. Demonic
refinement α ≤ i[ ] β of rank i holds if for every rank-i postcondition φ, dormant winning
strategies of [α]φ can be mapped constructively into strategies of [β]φ. Angelic refinement
α ≤ i〈〉 β maps active winning strategies of 〈α〉φ constructively into strategies of 〈β〉φ. Note
this difference carefully: Angelic refinement may be more familiar to the reader, but we take
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the Demonic presentation as primary, in large part because the theorems we wish to prove
are Demonic. Angelic and Demonic refinement are interdefinable: α ≤〈〉 β ↔ αd ≤[ ] βd and
vice versa. Rank is a technical device to ensure predicative quantification, see Section 4. You
may wish to ignore rank on the first reading: it can be inferred automatically, and we write
α ≤[ ] β when rank is unimportant.
The standard connectives of first-order constructive logic are definable from games and
comparisons. Verum (tt) is defined 1 > 0 and falsum (ff) is 0 > 1. Conjunction φ ∧ ψ is
defined 〈?φ〉ψ, disjunction φ∨ψ is 〈?φ∪?ψ〉tt, implication φ→ ψ is [?φ]ψ, universal quantifi-
cation ∀xφ is defined [x := ∗]φ, and existential quantification ∃xφ is 〈x := ∗〉φ. Equivalence
φ↔ ψ is (φ→ ψ)∧ (ψ → φ). As usual in constructive logics, negation ¬φ is defined φ→ ff,
and inequality is defined by f 6= g ≡ ¬(f = g). The defined game skip is the trivial test ?tt.
We will use the derived constructs freely but need only present semantics and proof rules
for the core constructs to minimize duplication. Indeed, it will aid in understanding of the
proof term language to keep the definitions above in mind, because the semantics for many
first-order programs mirror those from their counterpart in first-order constructive logic.
3.1 Example Game
As a simple example, consider a push-pull cart [38] on a 1 dimensional playing field with
boundaries xl ≤ x ≤ xr where x is the position of the cart and xl < xr strictly. The initial
position is written x0. Thes preconditions are in formula pre. Demon is at the left of the cart
and Angel at its right. Each player chooses to pull or push the cart, then the (oversimplified)
physics say velocity is proportional to the sum of forces. Physics can evolve so long as the
boundary xl ≤ x ≤ xr is respected, with duration chosen by Demon.
pre = xl < xr ∧ xl ≤ x0 = x ≤ xr
PP = {{L :=−1 ∪ L := 1}; {R :=−1 ∪R := 1}d; {x′ = L+R&xl ≤ x ≤ xr}}∗
A simple safety theorem for the push-pull game says that Angel has a strategy to ensure
position x remains constant (x = x0) no matter how Demon plays:
pre→ [PP]x = x0 (1)
The winning strategy that proves (1) is a simple mirroring strategy: Angel observes Demon’s
choice of L and plays the opposite value of R so that L+R = 0. Because L+R = 0, the
ODE simplifies to x′ = 0 &xl ≤ x ≤ xr, which has the trivial solution x(t) = x(0) for all
times t ∈ R≥0. Angel shows the safety theorem by replacing the ODE with its solution and
observing that x = x0 holds for all possible durations.
In addition to solution reasoning, CdGL supports differential invariant [38] reasoning
which appeals to the derivative of a term and differential ghost [38] reasoning which augments
an ODE with a new continuous variable. Solution reasoning suffices for this toy example, but
invariant reasoning is an essential part of CdGL because more complex games have ODEs
with non-polynomial, even non-elementary solutions. Ghost reasoning is also essential in
the case of differential invariants which are not inductive [39]. For these reasons, our proof
calculus (Section 5) will include solution, invariant, and ghost rules.
In contrast to a safety theorem, a liveness theorem would be shown by a progress argument.
Suppose that Angel could set L = 2 but Demon can only choose R ∈ {−1, 1}. Then Angel’s
liveness theorem might say she can achieve x = xr because the choice L = 2 ensures at least
1 unit of progress in x for each unit of time.
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4 Type-theoretic Semantics
We recall the type-theoretic semantics of CdGL [8] here in order to be self-contained. At
the same time, we define the semantics of the new refinement formulas α ≤ i[ ] β and also
generalize the semantics of CdGL to operate over an infinite tower of type universes, in
support of refinements. We first describe the assumptions made of the underlying type
theory.
4.1 Type Theory Assumptions
We assume a Calculus of Inductive and Coinductive Constructions (CIC)-like type the-
ory [13, 14, 42] with dependency and an infinite tower of cumulative predicative universes.
Predicativity is essential because our semantics are a large elimination, which would interact
dangerously with impredicative quantification. We assume first-class anonymous constructors
for (indexed [17]) inductive and coinductive types. We write τ for type families and κ
for kinds (those type families inhabited by other type families). Inductive type families
are written µt : κ. τ, which denotes the smallest solution ty of kind κ to the fixed-point
equation ty = [ty/t]τ. Coinductive type families are written ρt : κ. τ, which denotes the
largest solution ty of kind κ to the fixed-point equation ty = [ty/t]τ. Per Knaster-Tarski [24,
Thm. 1.12], the type-expression τ must be monotone in t to ensure that smallest and largest
solutions exist.
We write Ti for the i’th predicative universe.We write Πx : τ1. τ2 for a dependent function
type with argument named x of type τ1 where return type τ2 may mention x. We write
Σx : τ1. τ2 for a dependent pair type with left component named x of type τ1 and right
component of type τ2, possibly mentioning x. These specialize to the simple types τ1 → τ2
and τ1 * τ2 respectively when x is not mentioned in τ2. Lambdas (λx : τ. M) inhabit function
types. Pairs (M,N) inhabit dependent pair types. Let-binding unpacks pairs and piLM and
piRM are left and right projection. We write τ1 + τ2 for disjoint unions inhabited by ` ·M
and r ·M, and write case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C for case analysis, where ` and r are variables
over proofs.
We assume a type R for real numbers and type S for Euclidean state vectors supporting
scalar and vector sums, products, scalar inverses, and units. A state s : S assigns values
to every variable x ∈ V and supports the operations s x for retrieving the value of x and
set s x v for updating the value of x to v. Likewise, set s (x, y) (v, w) sets both x and y to v
and w, respectively. The usual axioms of setters and getters [21] are satisfied.
4.2 Semantics of CdGL
Terms f, g are interpreted into type theory as functions of type S → R. Games α (and
formulas φ) require a notion of rank R(α) (and R(φ)) indicating the smallest universe which
contains the semantics of α. By cumulativity of universes, the semantics will also belong to all
universes Ti such that i ≥ R(α). Refinement quantifies over types of a lower universe, which
is predicative. A refinement formula’s rank is given by its annotation: R(α ≤ i[ ] β) = 1 + i,
requiring R(α),R(β) ≤ i. In all other cases, the rank is the maximum of subexpressions’
ranks.
Formulas φ are interpreted as a predicate over states, i.e., a type family pφq : S→ TR(φ).
We say the formula φ is valid if there exists a term M : (Πs : S. pφq s). Function M is
allowed to inspect state s, but only using computable operations. The formula semantics are
defined in terms of the active and dormant semantics of games, which determine how Angel
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wins a game α whose postcondition is a formula φ whose semantics are pφq (variable P in the
game semantics). We write 〈〈α〉〉 : (S→ TR(α))→ (S→ TR(α)) for the active semantics of
α and [[α]] : (S→ TR(α))→ (S→ TR(α)) for its dormant semantics, which capture Angel’s
winning strategies when Angel is active or dormant, respectively. In contrast to classical
game logics, the diamond and box modalities are not interdefinable constructively. The rank
of an expression is only relevant in the refinement cases.
I Definition 4 (Formula semantics). pφq : S→ TR(φ) is defined by
p[α]φq s = [[α]] pφq s p〈α〉φq s = 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s pf ∼ gq s = ((f s) ∼ (g s))
p
α ≤ i[ ] β
q
s =
(
Πt : Ti.
(
[[α]] t s→ [[β]] t s))
The modality 〈α〉φ is true in state s when active Angel has a strategy 〈〈α〉〉 pφq s for game
α from state s to reach the region pφq on which φ has a proof. The modality [α]φ is true
in state s when dormant Angel has a strategy [[α]] for game α from state s to reach the
region pφq on which φ has a proof. For comparison operators ∼ ∈ {≤, <,=, >,≥, 6=}, the
values of f and g are compared at state s. Game α demonically refines β (α ≤[ ] β) from a
state s if for all postconditions t there exists a mapping from dormant strategies [[α]] t s to
dormant strategies [[β]] t s. That is, refinements may depend on the state (they are local or
contextual), but must hold for all postconditions t, as refinements consider the general game
form itself, not a game fixed to a particular postcondition. Because refinement formulas are
first-class, quantifiers may appear nested and in arbitrary positions, not necessarily prenex
form. We ensure predicativity by requiring that refinements quantify only over postconditions
of lower rank. Rank can be inferred in practice by inspecting a proof: each rank annotation
need only be as large as the rank of every postcondition in every application of rules R〈·〉
and R[·] from Section 5.
The semantics of games are simultaneously inductive with those for formulas and with
one another. In each case, the connectives which define [[α]] and 〈〈α〉〉 are duals, because [α]φ
and 〈α〉φ are dual. Below, P is the postcondition and s is the initial state.
I Definition 5 (Active semantics). 〈〈α〉〉 : (S→ TR(α))→ (S→ TR(α))
〈〈?ψ〉〉 P s = pψq s * P s
〈〈x := f〉〉 P s = P (set s x (f s))
〈〈x := ∗〉〉 P s = Σv : R. (P (set s x v))
〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 P s = 〈〈α〉〉 P s + 〈〈β〉〉 P s
〈〈α;β〉〉 P s = 〈〈α〉〉 (〈〈β〉〉 P ) s
〈〈αd〉〉 P s = [[α]] P s
〈〈x′ = f &ψ〉〉 P s = Σd : R≥0.Σsol : ([0, d]→ R).
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
* (Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t)))
* P
(
set s (x, x′)
(sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))
)
〈〈α∗〉〉 P s = (µτ ′ : (S→ TR(α)). λs′ : S. ((P s′ → τ ′ s′) + (〈〈α〉〉τ ′ s′ → τ ′ s′))) s
Angel wins ?ψ by proving both ψ and P at s. Angel wins the deterministic assignment
x := f by executing it, then proving P . Angel wins nondeterministic assignment x := ∗ by
choosing a value v to assign, then proving P . Angel wins α ∪ β by choosing to play game
α or β, then winning it. Angel wins α;β by winning α with the postcondition of winning
β. Angel wins αd if she wins α in the dormant role. Angel wins ODE game x′ = f &ψ
by choosing some solution y of some duration d for which she proves domain constraint ψ
throughout and the postcondition P at time d. While top-level postconditions rarely mention
x′, intermediate proof steps do, thus x and x′ are both updated in the postcondition. The
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construct (sol, s, d  x′ = f) says sol solves x′ = f from state s for time d (??). Active Angel
strategies for α∗ are inductively defined: either choose to stop the loop and prove P now, else
play a round of α before repeating inductively. By Knaster-Tarski [24, Thm. 1.12], this least
fixed point exists because a game’s semantics is monotone in its postcondition [8, Lem. 7].
I Definition 6 (Dormant semantics). [[α]] : (S→ TR(α))→ (S→ TR(α))
[[?ψ]] P s = pψq s→ P s
[[x := f ]] P s = P (set s x (f s))
[[x := ∗]] P s = Πv : R. (P (set s x v))
[[α ∪ β]] P s = [[α]] P s * [[β]] P s
[[α;β]] P s = [[α]] ([[β]] P ) s
[[αd]] P s = 〈〈α〉〉 P s
[[x′ = f &ψ]] P s = Πd : R≥0.Πsol : ([0, d]→ R).
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
→ (Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t)))
→ P (set s (x, x′)
(sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))
)
[[α∗]] P s =
(
ρτ ′ : (S→ TR(α)). λs′ : S. ((τ ′ s′ → [[α]] τ ′ s′) * (τ ′ s′ → P s′))
)
s
Angel wins ?ψ by proving P under assumption ψ, which Demon must provide. Deterministic
assignment is unchanged. Angel wins x := ∗ by proving P for every choice of x. Angel
wins α ∪ β with a pair of winning strategies, since Demon chooses whether to play α or β.
Angel wins α;β by winning α with a postcondition of winning β. Angel wins αd if she can
win α actively. Angel wins x′ = f &ψ if for an arbitrary duration and arbitrary solution
which satisfy the domain constraint, Angel can prove the postcondition. Dormant repetition
strategies are coinductive using some invariant τ ′. When Demon decides to stop the loop,
Angel responds by proving P from τ ′. Whenever Demon chooses to continue, Angel proves
that τ ′ is preserved. Greatest fixed points exist by Knaster-Tarski [24, Thm. 1.12] using
monotonicity [8, Lem. 7].
In general, strategies are constructive but permit the opponent to play classically. In the
cyber-physical setting, their opponent is indeed rarely a computer.
4.3 Proof Terms
Proof termsM,N,O (sometimes A,BC) for CdGL [8, 7] are syntactic analogs of the semantics
and will be exploited in Section 6.2. See AppendixB for corresponding CdGL proof rules. We
elide proof terms for the new refinement rules for space reasons. Proof terms are inductively
defined:
M,N,O ::= p | ` ·M | r ·M | 〈case M of `⇒ N | r ⇒ O〉 | λx : R. M | λp : φ. M
| 〈[M,N ]〉 | 〈[x := f yx in p. M ]〉 | 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 | 〈[ι M ]〉 | M rep p : J. N in O
| for(M : ϕ(M); q.N ;O){α} | AS(d, sln, dom,M) | DS(sln,M)
| DC(M,N) | DG(y0, a, b,M)
where p, q, `, r are proof variables, which range over proof terms of a given proposition.
Whenever the same proof term construct proves some Angelic property and some Demonic
property, we notate 〈·〉 for Angelic proofs, [·] for Demonic proofs, and 〈[·]〉 to refer to both.
Proof variable references p are proof terms. Injections 〈` ·M〉 and 〈r ·M〉 are case-
analyzed by 〈case M of ` ⇒ N | r ⇒ O〉. Lambdas (λx : R. M) and (λp : φ. M) prove
Demonic nondeterministic assignment and test, respectively. Pairs 〈[M,N ]〉 are used both
for Angelic tests and Demonic choices. Deterministic assignment 〈[x := f yx in p. M ]〉 and
Angelic nondeterministic assignment 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 remembers the old value of x in variable
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y with proof variable p describing the new value of x given by f . Sequential composition
is 〈[ι M ]〉. For Demonic repetition games α∗, coinduction (M rep p : J. N in O) has M
for a base case, N for a coinductive step mentioning coinductive hypothesis p : J, and O
showing the postcondition follows from the invariant J . For Angelic repetition, induction
for(M : ϕ(M); q.N ;O){α} is witnessed by variant formula ϕ and termination metricM (not
to be confused with proof term M which shows that ϕ holds initially). N shows that α
maintains ϕ while decreasingM and O shows that the postcondition follows. The remaining
terms prove ODEs and are closely related to the refinement rules of Section 5. The “solve”
rules parallel the semantics. We use variable name sln for a solution term, which is a function
of the state, interdefinable with the semantics’ use of name sol for a solution as a function of
time. Angelic solve AS(d, sln, dom,M) specifies duration d for solution sln whose domain is
proven by dom and postcondition by M . Demonic solve DS(sln,M) uses solution sln, while
postcondition M expects d and dom as arguments. Differential cut DC(M : ρ,N) proves
postcondition ρ via M, which is cut into the domain constraint in N . Differential ghost [39]
DG(y0, a, b,M) introduces a new continuous variable. It specifies initial value y0 for ghost
y with y′ = a(y) + b used to prove postcondition M . Cuts and ghosts are useful for ODEs
whose solutions are complicated or even non-elementary.
5 Refinement Proof Calculus
We give a natural deduction calculus for hybrid game refinements. Refinement is relative to
a context Γ of CdGL formulas, which may include refinements. All rules are expressed as
Demonic refinements α ≤ i[ ] β, but an Angelic refinement α ≤ i〈〉 β is supported by refining
the duals αd ≤ i[ ] βd. Remember that in a Demonic refinement, the Angelic (existential)
connectives appear under dualities αd. We write α ∼= β for α ≤[ ] β ∧β ≤[ ] α. In rules ;S and
un∗ we write bold α or α1 for metavariables over systems not containing a dual operator,
while unbolded metavariables are arbitrary games.
The elimination rules for refinements are R〈·〉 and R[·], which say every true postcondition
φ of a game α is a true postcondition of every β which α refines. The side condition for R〈·〉
and R[·] is that R(φ) ≤ i where i is the rank annotation of the refinement. These are the
only rules which care about rank, so ranks can be inferred from proofs by inspecting the
uses of these rules. While rank is of little practical import, it ensures a predicative formal
foundation.
Fig. 1 gives the refinement rules for discrete connectives. Unlike dRL [31], we face the
subtlety that game logics are subnormal [25]: For a game α, formula [α](φ ∧ ψ) need not
hold when both [α]φ and [α]ψ do. Rules which required normality in dRL can be adapted to
CdGL in two ways: restrict some argument to be a system (;S) or require some assumptions
to hold globally, in the empty context (;G). Each approach is useful in different cases. Rules
〈?〉 and [?] refine tests by weakening or strengthening test conditions. Rules 〈∪〉R1 and
〈∪〉R2 say each branch refines an Angelic choice, while [∪]R says a Demonic choice is refined
by refining both branches. One sequence refines another piecewise in the ;S rule, which is
contextual: refinement of the second component exploits the fact that the first component
has been executed. Rule un∗ compares loops by comparing their bodies and rolll allows
unrolling a loop before refining. Rule ;G is a variant of ;S which says α1 can be an arbitrary
game, but only if β1 ≤[ ] β2 holds in the empty context. System α1 n the second premiss of
;S could soundly be α2, but in practical proofs it is often more convenient to work with [α1]
because it is a system modality, which is normal. Rules 〈:∗〉 and [:∗] say that deterministic
assignments refine nondeterministic ones. Rules skipd, :=d, and ;d says skip and x := f are
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R〈·〉 Γ ` 〈α〉φ Γ ` α ≤
i
〈〉 β
Γ ` 〈β〉φ
1
〈?〉 Γ ` φ→ ψΓ `?φd ≤[ ]?ψd
[?]
Γ ` ψ → φ
Γ `?φ ≤[ ]?ψ
〈:∗〉 Γ ` x := fd ≤[ ] x := ∗d
[:∗] Γ ` x := ∗ ≤[ ] x := f
[∪]L1 Γ ` α ∪ β ≤[ ] α
[∪]L2 Γ ` α ∪ β ≤[ ] β
[∪]R Γ ` α ≤[ ] β Γ ` α ≤[ ] γΓ ` α ≤[ ] β ∪ γ
R[·] Γ ` [α]φ Γ ` α ≤
i
[ ] β
Γ ` [β]φ
1
;S
Γ ` α1 ≤[ ] α2 Γ ` [α1]β1 ≤[ ] β2
Γ ` α1;β1 ≤[ ] α2;β2
2
;G
Γ ` α1 ≤[ ] α2 · ` β1 ≤[ ] β2
Γ ` α1;β1 ≤[ ] α2;β2
un∗ Γ ` [α
∗](α ≤[ ] β)
Γ ` α∗ ≤[ ] β∗
2
rolll Γ `?tt ∪ {α;α∗} ∼= α∗
〈∪〉R1 Γ ` αd ≤[ ] {α ∪ β}d
〈∪〉R2 Γ ` βd ≤[ ] {α ∪ β}d
〈∪〉L Γ ` α
d ≤[ ] γ Γ ` βd ≤[ ] γ
Γ ` {α ∪ β}d ≤[ ] γ
skipd skipd ∼= skip ;d {α;β}d ∼= αd;βd :=d x := fd ∼= x := f DDE (αd)d ∼= α
1 assuming R(φ) ≤ i
2 α1 respectively α is a hybrid system
Figure 1 Refinement of discrete connectives
self-dual and the dual of a sequence is a sequence of duals. Double duals cancel by DDE.
The rules in Fig. 2 are selected algebraic properties which will be used in the proof of
Theorem10. These rules generalize known game equalities [23] to refinement. Some rules
of dRL [31] are reused here, but others, such as those for repetitions α∗ are not sound for
arbitrary games. Rules refl and trans say refinement is a partial order. Sequence has identities
(;idl and ;idr). Rule :=:= deduplicates a double assignment if the first assignment does not
influence the second: FV(f) are the free variables mentioned in f . Choice (∪A) and sequence
(;A) are associative, and choice is commutative (∪c) and idempotent (∪idem), while sequence
is right-distributive (;dr). Impossible tests can annihilate any following program annihl.
Assigning a variable to itself is a no-op (:=nop).
Fig. 3 gives the ODE refinement rules. Differential cut DC says the domain constraints φ
and φ∧ψ are equivalent if ψ holds as a postcondition under domain constraint φ. Differential
weakening DW says an ODE is overapproximated by the program which assumes only the
domain constraint. Differential solution SOL says that a solvable Angelic ODE x′ = f &ψ
with syntactic solution term sln refined by a deterministic program which assigns the solution
to x after some duration through which the domain constraint holds. Here sln = (λs :
S. (sol (s t))) is the term corresponding to semantic solution sol. Differential ghosts DG
soundly augments an ODE with a fresh dimension y so long as the solution exists as long
as that of x, and is known [39] to enable proofs of otherwise unprovable properties. The
right-hand side for y is required to be linear in y because this suffices to ensure sufficient
duration. Axiom DG is not a strict equality because linear ODEs do not necessarily suffice
to reach every of the nondeterministically assigned final values for y and y′.
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trans
Γ ` α ≤[ ] β Γ ` β ≤[ ] γ
Γ ` α ≤[ ] γ
refl Γ ` α ≤[ ] α
;idl Γ ` {?tt;α} ∼= α
;idr Γ ` {α; ?tt} ∼= α
annihl Γ `?ff;α ∼= ?ff
:=nop Γ ` {x := x} ∼= ?tt
;dr Γ ` {α ∪ β}; γ ∼= {α; γ} ∪ {β; γ}
;A Γ ` {α;β}; γ ∼= α; {β; γ}
:=:= Γ ` x := f ;x := g ∼= x := g 1
∪A Γ ` {α ∪ β} ∪ γ ∼= α ∪ {β ∪ γ}
∪c Γ ` α ∪ β ∼= β ∪ α
∪idem Γ ` α ∪ α ∼= α
1 for x /∈ FV(g)
Figure 2 Algebraic rules (selected)
DC
Γ ` [x′ = f &φ]ψ
Γ ` {x′ = f &φ} ∼= {x′ = f &φ ∧ ψ} DW Γ ` {x := ∗;x
′ := f ; ?ψ} ≤[ ] {x′ = f &ψ}
SOL
Γ ` [t := ∗; ?0 ≤ t ≤ d;x := sln]ψ
Γ, t = 0, d ≥ 0 ` {t := d;x := sln;x′ := f ; t′ := 1} ≤[ ] {{t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ}d}
1
DG Γ ` {y := f0;x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ} ≤[ ] {x′ = f &ψ; {y := ∗; y′ := ∗}d}
1 sln solves ODE, {t, t′, x, x′} ∩ FV (d) = ∅
Figure 3 Differential equation refinements
6 Theory
We develop theoretical results about CdGL refinements: soundness and the relationship
between games and systems. Proofs are in AppendixC.
6.1 Soundness
The sine qua non condition of any logic is soundness. We show that every formula provable
in the CdGL refinement calculus is true in the type-theoretic semantics.
I Theorem 7 (Soundness). If Γ ` φ is provable then the sequent Γ ` φ is valid.
6.2 Inlining
A game α describes what actions are allowed for each player but not how Angel selects
among them given an adversarial Demon. Every game modality proof, whether of [α]φ or
〈α〉φ, lets Demon make arbitrary (universally-quantified) moves within the confines of the
game, and describes Angel’s strategy to achieve a given postcondition φ. Whereas a given
game can contain both Angelic and Demonic choices, a system can only contain one or the
other: modality [α]φ treats a system α as Demonic while 〈α〉φ treats a system as Angelic.
A folklore theorem describes the relation between hybrid games and hybrid systems: given
a proof (winning strategy) for a hybrid game, one can “inline” Angel’s strategy to produce a
hybrid system which implements that strategy. The resulting system commits to Angel’s
choices according to the strategy and only leaves choices for the opponent Demon. The
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constructivity of CdGL ensures that Angel’s choices are implementable by effective functions.
Since Demonic choices survive inlining, it is simplest to work with Demonic game modalities
[α]φ here, but every Angelic game modality 〈α〉φ could equivalently be expressed as [αd]φ.
In this section, we formally define the inlining operation and specify its relation to the source
game using refinements and CdGL proof terms M . Given a proof M of some game property
[α]φ in context Γ, we will construct the system αmodM by inlining the strategy M in α.
The system αmodM needs to commit to Angel’s strategy according to M while retaining
all available choices of Demon. What properties ought αmodM satisfy?
Committing to a safe Angel strategy should never make the system less safe. The safety
postcondition φ should transfer to αmodM, i.e., the following property should hold:
Γ ` [αmodM ]φ
However, transfer alone does not capture inlining. For example, if we defined αmodM =?ff
for all α and M , we would vacuously satisfy the transfer property but certainly not capture
the meaning of strategy M .
We, thus, guarantee a converse direction. The inlining αmodM is a safety refinement of
α, so that every postcondition ψ satisfying [αmodM ]ψ also satisfies [α]ψ:
Γ ` αmodM ≤[ ] α
Intuitively, [αmodM ]ψ says postcondition ψ holds for every Demon behavior of αmodM,
while [α]ψ holds if there exists an Angel strategy that ensures ψ for every Demon behavior
of α. Since strategy M is designed to satisfy ψ, there certainly exists a strategy M that
satisfies ψ. Refinement captures the notion that Angelic choices in αmodM are made more
strictly than in α, while Demonic choices are only made more loosely.
Even transfer and refinement do not fully validate the inlining operation, since defining
αmodM = α suffices to ensure both. This leads to a third, most obvious property: αmodM
must be a system when α is a game. Not only are systemhood, transfer, and refinement all
desirable properties for inlining, but their combination is an appealing specification because
there is no trivial operation which satisfies all three. If the above three properties hold,
they also imply a sound version of the normal modal logic axiom K that is elusive in games:
If Γ ` M : [α]φ and Γ ` [αmodM ]ψ, then Γ ` [α](φ ∧ ψ). Additionally, transfer and
systemhood suggest that game synthesis can “export” a game proof to a systems proof, for
which synthesis tools already exist [34, 9]. We discuss some technicalities first.
Technicalities
Inlining is recursively defined over the natural deduction proof terms of Section 4.3. We find
it useful to work entirely with modalities of the form [α;L]ψ, where L is a “list” of games
which continue execution following α. Angelic programs are represented by duality αd and
terminal programs are supported by letting L = skip. This style is interchangeable with
normal-form CdGL proofs; we elide the sequential composition ([α;β]φ↔ [α][β]φ) and duality
([αd]φ ↔ 〈α〉φ) steps which convert between the two. Prior work [7] shows case-analysis,
which is not canonical, is sometimes normal because state-dependent cases are decided only
at runtime. Normal case analyses are analogous to case-tree normal forms in lambda calculi
with coproducts [2]. Normal forms of (classical) ODE proofs have been characterized [6].
We say a formula, context, or proof is system-test if the only modalities it mentions are box
system modalities. Restricting inlining to the system-test fragment ensures the inlining of a
proof variable p is a system. System-test is stronger than weak-test (no modalities in tests)
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but weaker than strong-test (arbitrary modalities in tests). We are not aware of practical
use cases which require strong-test.
Definitions
We define the inlining operation. Inlining is defined in terms of dormant proofs: αmodM is
a hybrid system when M is a proof of some [α]φ. We represent Angelic connectives with box
proofs of dual games: αd modM inlines a box proof M of [αd]φ, which is simply a diamond
proof of 〈α〉φ. We first give the inlining of case-analysis and hypothesis proofs, the only two
normal proofs which are not introduction forms.
Lmod p = L
Lmod 〈case A : (P ∨Q) of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 = {?P ;LmodB} ∪ {?Q;Lmod C}
Proof by hypothesis trivially refines L to itself, since they lack a concrete strategy for L.
Case analysis allows Demon to choose either branch, so long as it is provable. When P and Q
are not mutually exclusive, the inlining is nondeterministic. Both P and Q are game-free in
the system-test fragment and, in practical proofs, even quantifier-free first-order arithmetic.
We first give the Angelic cases, which plug in the specific Angel strategy from proof M .
{x := fd;L}mod (〈x := f yx in p. M〉) = x := f ; {LmodM}
{x := ∗d;L}mod (〈f yx :∗ p. M〉) = x := f ; {LmodM}
{?ψd;L}mod 〈M,N〉 = LmodN
{{α;β}d;L}mod 〈ι M〉 = {αd; {βd;L}}modM
{{α ∪ β}d;L}mod 〈` ·M〉 = {αd;L}modM
{{α ∪ β}d;L}mod 〈r ·M〉 = {βd;L}modM
{α∗d;L}mod (for(M : ϕ(M); q.N ;O){α}) = {?M  0; {αd modN}}∗; ?M = 0; {LmodO}
Discrete assignments are unchanged. Nondeterministic assignments are determinized with
the assignment witness from the proof by 〈:∗〉. Subtly, Angelic tests can be eliminated by
〈?〉 because they are proven to succeed and because we wish only to keep tests which Demon
is required to pass. A normal-form proof for a sequential composition α;β proves α with β
in the postcondition. By ;A, sequential compositions can be reassociated. Normal Angelic
choice proofs are injections, so Angelic proofs inline by 〈∪〉R1 or 〈∪〉R2 according to one
branch or the other. Normal Angelic repetition proofs are by convergence: some metric
M decreases while maintaining invariant ϕ. Hybrid systems loops are nondeterministic, so
Demon chooses the loop duration, but the Demonic testM  0 must pass at each repetition
andM = 0 must pass at the end, determinizing the loop duration.
To inline a discrete Demonic connective, we do not restrict Demon’s capabilities, but
recursively traverse the proof so that Angelic proof terms can be inlined.
{x := f ;L}mod [x := f yx in p. M ] = x := f ; {LmodM}
{x := ∗;L}mod (λx : R. M) = x := ∗; {LmodM}
{?ψ;L}mod (λq : ψ. M) = ?ψ; {LmodM}
{{α;β};L}mod [ι M ] = {α;β;L}modM
{{α ∪ β};L}mod [M,N ] = {{α;L}modM} ∪ {{β;L}modN}
{α∗;L}mod (M rep p : J. N in O) = {αmodN}∗; {LmodO}
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Nondeterministic Demonic assignments, unlike Angelic ones, are not modified during inlining,
because Demon retains the power to choose any value. Demonic tests introduce assumptions,
and must continue to do so in the inlined system to avoid changing the acceptable behavior.
Demonic sequential compositions, like Angelic ones, reassociate. Demonic choices follow the
distributive normal form of Demonic choice proofs, which prove each branch separately. By
;dr, the distributed proof entails a proof of the original. Demonic repetitions keep the loop,
recalling that the coinductive loop invariant J justifies postcondition by O.
We give the inlining cases for ODEs. The inlining of an invariant-based Demonic proof (DC
and DW) is a relaxation of the ODE: the inlined system need not follow the precise behavior
of the ODE so long as all invariants required for the proof are obeyed. Indeed, this is where
proof-based synthesis in ModelPlex [34] gains much of its power: real implementations never
follow an ODE with perfect precision, but usually do follow its invariant-based relaxation.
{t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψd;L}modAS(d, sln, dom,M) =
{t := d;x := sln;x′ := f}; t′ := 1; {LmodM}
t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ;LmodDS(sln, λd dom. M) = {t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ; {LmodM}}
{x′ = f &ψ;L}modDC(M : ρ,N) = {x′ = f &ψ ∧ ρ;L}modN
{x′ = f &ψ;L}modDW (M) = {x := ∗;x′ := f ; ?ψ; {LmodM}}
{x′ = f &ψ; y := ∗; y′ := ∗d;L}modDG(y0, a, b,M) =
{y := f0; {x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L}modM}
An Angelic ODE solution (AS) specifies ODE duration d and solution term sln. The Angelic
domain constraint is comparable to an Angelic test, so proved, and, hence, omitted in
the inlining. In Demonic ODE solutions (DS), the duration and domain constraint are
assumptions. Since our ODEs are Lipschitz, they have unique solutions and Demon could
inline the unique solution of the ODE, as does case (AS). There is no obvious benefit to doing
so, except that the inlined system would fall within discrete dynamic logic. Differential Cut
(DC) inlining introduces an assumption in the domain constraint, and is sound by DC. By
itself, DC strengthens a program, but in combination with DW enables relaxation of ODEs.
Differential Weakening (DW) relaxes an ODE by allowing x and x′ to change arbitrarily so
long as the domain constraint ψ (and thus invariants introduced by DC) remain true.
Inlining Example
Recall example PP and its safety property (1). Let M be the proof of (1) with a mirroring
strategy described in Section 3.1. Then the result of inlining is
PP modM =
{{L :=−1;R := 1;x′ = L+R&xl ≤ x ≤ xr}
∪{L := 1;R :=−1;x′ = L+R&xl ≤ x ≤ xr}
}∗
which we discuss step-by-step. Demonic repetition inlining just repeats the body. Inlining a
Demonic choice follows the structure of the proof, not the source program, hence the ODE
occurs for each branch. Each branch commits to a choice of L, and each branch of M resolves
the Angelic choice R to balance out L. When inlining an Angelic choice, only the branch
taken is emitted. In PPmodM, we assume thatM proves the ODE x′ = L+R&xl ≤ x ≤ xr
by replacing it with its solution, which is why the ODE appears verbatim in the refined
system. A differential invariant proof could also be used with a differential cut (DC) of x = x0,
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in which case physics are represented by the program x := ∗;x′ := ∗; ?xl ≤ x ≤ xr ∧x = x0 in
the result of inlining. Different proofs generally give rise to different linings, some of which
are less restrictive than others. Differential invariants, especially inequational invariants,
(x ≥ x0 vs. x = x0) can be more easily monitored with finite-precision numbers.
Note that the system PPmodM is a refinement of PP and satisfies the same safety theorem
pre→ [PP modM ]x = x0. Next, we show that this is the case for all inlined strategies.
Theorems
We state theorems (proven in AppendixC) showing how the inlining of a game α refines
α. Recall that Γ, α, φ, and M are in the system-test fragment of CdGL.
I Theorem 8 (Systemhood). αmodM is a system, i.e., it does not contain dualities.
I Theorem 9 (Inlining transfer). If Γ `M : [α]φ for system-test Γ,M, and hybrid game α
then Γ ` [αmodM ]φ.
I Theorem 10 (Inlining refinement). If Γ `M : [α]φ for system-test Γ,M, and hybrid game
α then Γ ` αmodM ≤[ ] α.
Theorem8 is proven by trivial induction on M . Theorem9 is proven by inducting on M,
reusing its contents in a proof for α modM . Theorem10 inducts on M and in each case
appeals to the corresponding refinement rule. The fact that Theorem10 could be proved
validates the strength of our refinement rules.
7 Conclusion
We developed a refinement calculus for Constructive Differential Game Logic (CdGL). Tech-
nical challenges in this development included the facts that game logic is subnormal and
that the constructive box and diamond modalities [α]φ and 〈α〉φ are not interdefinable. We
introduced a new constructive semantics for refinement and proved soundness. We formalized
an inlining operation and folklore theorem which reduce verified hybrid games to hybrid
systems by specializing a game to the commitments made by its winning strategy. The imme-
diate application of the inlining operation, which we will pursue in future work, is to enable
translating game proofs into the systems proofs which are supported by existing synthesis
tools. This allows exploiting the greater expressive power of games without reimplementing
tools. Once an implementation is available, there are wide array of applications studied
in the hybrid systems and hybrid games literature which would benefit from the modeling
power and synthesis guarantees that are possible with CdGL.
Our refinement calculus is of theoretical and practical interest beyond reducing games
to systems. We expect that refinements can be used to provide shorter proofs, to compare
the efficacy (dominance) of two strategies for the same game, and to determine when two
strategies or programs should be considered “the same”. These questions are worth pursuing
both for hybrid games and for games in general.
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A Semantics Details
We give the precise definitions of differentials (f)′ and solutions (sol, s, d  x′ = f) here.
The differential term (f)′ is definable when f is differentiable. Not every term f need
be differentiable, so we give a virtual definition, defining when (f)′ is equal to some term
g. If (f)′ does not exist, (f)′ = g is not provable. We define the (total) derivative as the
dot product (·) of gradient ∇ with s′, which is the vector of values s x′ assigned to primed
variables. To show that ∇ is the gradient, we define the gradient as a limit, which we express
in (, δ) style.
((f)′ s = g s) ≡ ∃∇ :R|s′| (g s = ∇·s′)*Π : R+.Σδ : R+.Πr : S.
(‖r − s‖ < δ)→ |f r − f s−∇·(r − s)| ≤ ‖r − s‖
For practical proofs, a library of standard rules for automatic, syntactic differentiation of
common arithmetic operations can be proven.
The predicate (sol, s, d  x′ = f) simply employs (sol)′ to say that the solution satisfies
the differential equation at every time, and also insures that the solution is compatible with
the initial state.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)↔ ((s x = sol 0) *Πr : [0, d]. ((sol)′ r = f (set s x (sol r))))
The main paper also mentions both active and demonic strategies are constructive, but
allow classical opponents. We give an example here: consider the relationship between
active and dormant semantics of x := ∗. Angel gives a computable strategy for x, which
are countably many. However, the dormant player does not care how x was determined,
and can handle any of the uncountably many values of type R. This mirrors the distinction
between computable reals (countable) and computable functions over reals (countably many,
uncountable domain).
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B CdGL Proof Rules
We give the full proof calculus for CdGL from prior work [7, 8] for the sake of being complete.
In addition to proof terms mentioned in the main paper, the full calculus includes elimination
forms (which, except case analysis, are not normal forms) and several admissible rules.
Because many proof rules come in symmetric pairs for Angelic and Demonic proofs, the
corresponding proof terms are distinguished, usually with square brackets for Demonic and
angle brackets for Angelic, or sometimes with different names. Demonic projections support
both choices and repetitions. When the same exact rule schema describes both rules, we
write 〈[α]〉φ for “either modality” and [〈α〉]φ for its “opposite”. The additional proof terms
M,N,O (sometimes A,B,C) are given by the grammar:
M,N,O ::= · · · 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 | FP(A, s. B, g. C) | M N | M f
| 〈[pi1M ]〉 | 〈[pi2M ]〉 | 〈stop M〉 | 〈go M〉 | unpack(M,py. N) | 〈[yield M ]〉 | FO[φ](M)
where the proof variables s and g are mnemonic for “stop” and “go”. Diamond repetition
case analysis term 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 is distinguished from diamond choice case
analysis. Fixed point elimination FP(A, s. B, g. C) eliminates a diamond repetition induc-
tively. Application and projection are standard. Diamond repetition injectors are 〈stop M〉
and 〈go M〉. Existential elimination is unpack(M,py. N). Dual introduction 〈[yield M ]〉 is
left implicit in the main paper, for example in every Angelic case of inlining. Eliminators are
not shown here for duals, deterministic assignment, and sequential composition, because they
are just inverses of the introduction rules where the premiss and conclusion are swapped.
We leave first-order arithmetic to the “metalogic” and write it FO[φ](M) for conclusion φ
which follows from the fact proven by M . First-order reasoning is captured in the following
rule FO, the only rule in CdGL which is not effective (cannot be syntactically checked by a
computer). We allow this non-effective rule precisely because we assume the premiss will be
checked externally by some proof system for first-order constructive arithmetic.
FO
Γ `M : ρ
Γ ` FO[φ](M) :φ where exists M : Πs : S.
pρ→ φq s, for ρ, φ F.O.
The rules for discrete CGL [7] are given in Fig. 4. Free variables of an expression e are
written FV(e) in side conditions. For the most part, the rules follow the semantics closely.
Rules for implications, universal quantifiers, conjunctions and disjunctions are analogous
to those from the literature. Sequential composition decomposes the modality into two.
Duality introduction alternates modalities. In classical game logic, this definition of duality
is often considered secondary to the classical duality [αd]P = ¬[α]¬P . However, the latter
equivalence does not hold constructively, thus the notion of duality as modality alternation is
primary in CdGL. Rules 〈∗〉I and [∗]I, while complex, correspond to well-known convergence
(cf. termination) and invariant arguments.
Convergence says a variant formula ϕ is maintained as a termination metricM converges
to its zero value 0. Fixed-point elimination FP is also inductive, and should be understood
as traversing the execution of a loop in reverse. If 〈α〉φ is true, show that some ψ follows
from φ everywhere, and that ψ is preserved when unwinding the loop, which shows ψ holds
now. Assignment and existential quantifier proof terms are notationally heavyweight, but
this is only because they combine an explicit renaming step with the standard existential
rule. These renamings aid the normalization theorem of prior work [7] and free a user from
manually applying renaming steps. Some side conditions persist after renaming, for example
the side condition of 〈:∗〉E says that an existential variable cannot escape its scope.
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〈∪〉E Γ ` A : 〈α ∪ β〉φ Γ, ` : 〈α〉φ ` B :ψ Γ, r : 〈β〉φ ` C :ψΓ ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 :ψ
〈∗〉C Γ ` A : 〈α
∗〉φ Γ, s : φ ` B :ψ Γ, g : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ ` C :ψ
Γ ` 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 :ψ
〈∪〉I1 Γ `M : 〈α〉φΓ ` 〈` ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
〈∪〉I2 Γ `M : 〈β〉φΓ ` 〈r ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
[∪]I Γ `M : [α]φ Γ ` N : [β]φΓ ` [M,N ] : [α ∪ β]φ
〈?〉I Γ `M :φ Γ ` N :ψΓ ` 〈M,N〉 : 〈?φ〉ψ
[?]I
Γ, p : φ `M :ψ
Γ ` (λp : φ. M) : [?φ]ψ
[?]E
Γ `M : [?φ]ψ Γ ` N :φ
Γ ` (M N) :ψ
[∪]E1 Γ `M : [α ∪ β]φΓ ` [pi1M ] : [α]φ
[∪]E2 Γ `M : [α ∪ β]φΓ ` [pi2M ] : [β]φ
hyp Γ, p : φ ` p :φ
〈?〉E1 Γ `M : 〈?φ〉ψΓ ` 〈pi1M〉 :φ
〈?〉E2 Γ `M : 〈?φ〉ψΓ ` 〈pi2M〉 :ψ
[∗]E1 Γ `M : [α
∗]φ
Γ ` [pi1M ] :φ
〈∗〉S Γ `M :φΓ ` 〈stop M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ
〈∗〉G Γ `M : 〈α〉〈α
∗〉φ
Γ ` 〈go M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ
[∗]R Γ `M :φ Γ ` N : [α][α
∗]φ
Γ ` [M,N ] : [α∗]φ
〈[;]〉I Γ `M :〈[α]〉〈[β]〉φΓ ` 〈[ι M ]〉 :〈[α;β]〉φ
〈[d]〉I Γ `M :[〈α〉]φΓ ` 〈[yield M ]〉 :〈[αd]〉φ
[∗]E2 Γ `M : [α
∗]φ
Γ ` [pi2M ] : [α][α∗]φ
〈∗〉I
Γ ` A :ϕ p : ϕ, q :M0 =M  0 ` B : 〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M)
p : ϕ, q :M = 0 ` C :φ
Γ ` for(A : ϕ(M); q.B;C){α} : 〈α∗〉φ
1
[∗]I Γ `M : J p : J ` N : [α]J p : J ` O :φΓ ` (M rep p. N in O) : [α∗]φ FP
Γ ` A : 〈α∗〉φ s : φ ` B :ψ g : 〈α〉ψ ` C :ψ
Γ ` FP(A, s. B, g. C) :ψ
1 M0 fresh
〈[: =]〉I Γ
y
x , p : (x = f
y
x ) `M :φ
Γ ` 〈[x := f yx in p. M ]〉 :〈[x := f ]〉φ
1
[:∗]I Γ
y
x `M :φ
Γ ` (λx : R. M) : [x := ∗]φ
1
〈:∗〉I Γ
y
x , p : (x = f
y
x ) `M :φ
Γ ` 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 : 〈x := ∗〉φ
1
〈:∗〉E Γ `M : 〈x := ∗〉φ Γ
y
x , p : φ ` N :ψ
Γ ` unpack(M,py. N) :ψ
2
[:∗]E Γ `M : [x := ∗]φ
Γ `M f :φfx
3
1 y (and p) fresh
2 y fresh, x /∈ FV(ψ)
3 φfx admiss.
Figure 4 CdGL proof calculus: discrete games
Next, we give the proof terms for differential equations in Fig. 5. The proofs term for DG
and 〈′〉 exploit the Existential Property: since the proof of the premiss always contains a
witness, we can assume as much in the rule, so that the proof term of the conclusion can
copy the witness from the premiss.
Several derivable rules are discussed in Fig. 6. Rule Dec is a special case of FO which
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DI
Γ `M :φ Γ ` N :∀x (ψ → [x′ := f ](φ)′)
Γ ` DI(M,N) : [x′ = f &ψ]φ
DC
Γ `M : [x′ = f &ψ]R Γ ` N : [x′ = f &ψ ∧R]φ
Γ ` DC(M,N) : [x′ = f &ψ]φ
DW
Γ `M :∀x ∀x′ (ψ → φ)
Γ ` DW (M) : [x′ = f &ψ]φ
DG
Γ ` 〈y0 yx :∗ p. M〉 :∃y [x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]φ
Γ ` DG(y0, a, b,M) : [x′ = f &ψ]φ
bsolve
Γ `M :(∀t :R≥0 ((∀r : [0, t] [t := r;x := sln]ψ)→ [x := sln;x′ := f ]φ))
Γ ` DS(sln,M) : [x′ = f &ψ]φ
dsolve
Γ ` 〈d yx :∗ p. 〈M,N〉〉 :∃t :R≥0 ((∀r : [0, t] 〈t := r;x := sln〉ψ) ∧ 〈x := sln;x′ := f〉φ)
Γ ` AS(d, sln,M,N) : 〈x′ = f &ψ〉φ
Figure 5 CdGL proof calculus: continuous games. In bsolve and dsolve, sln solves x′ = f globally,
t and r fresh, x′ /∈ FV(φ)
says that while excluded middle does not hold in general, it is perfectly acceptable to apply
excluded-middle-like reasoning to any disjunction which is known to be decidable. The
most common application of Dec is an approximate comparison <, which is not only sound
but effective and can thus be proofchecked syntactically. The discrete ghost iG allows
introducing a fresh game variable during a proof and can be derived from the rules for
quantifiers. Monotonicity M often serves a similar role to Kripke’s modal modus ponens
axiom K, which does not hold in game logics [36]. It is used, for example, for concise
right-to-left symbolic execution proofs. The normalization theorem for discrete CGL [7] shows
that CGL’s monotonicity rule is admissible. We hypothesize that it is also admissible in
full CdGL. The main requirement for admissible monotonicity is that the core rules permit
postcondition generalization, for example in [∗]I.
Dec
Γ `M : ρ
Γ ` (Dec[φ ∨ ψ](M)) :φ ∨ ψ
1
<
Γ `M : ε > 0
Γ ` (split [f, g + ε] M) : f > g ∨ f < g + ε
iG
Γ, p : x = f `M :φ
Γ ` Ghost[x = f ](p. M) :φ
2
M
Γ `M : 〈α〉φ Γ ~yBV(α) , p : φ ` N :ψ
Γ `M◦pN : 〈α〉ψ
1 exists M : (Πs : S. pρ→ φ ∨ ψq s), for ρ, φ, ψ F.O.
2 x fresh except free in M, p fresh
Figure 6 CdGL derived and admissible rules
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C Theory proofs
Notations and Preliminaries
Recall that the free variables FV(e) of expression e are those which influence meaning,
while bound variables BV(α) of a game are those which might change during play. We use
syntactic-level (FV(φ)) and semantic-level (FV(pφq)) notions of free variable interchangeably
here. Free variables, bound variables, and the relations between their semantic and syntactic
characterizations are discussed thoroughly in prior work [8]. We notate vectors with arrows,
e.g., ~x for vectors of variables in vectorial assignments.
C.1 Properties of Refinement
While the semantics we gave for refinement are concise and general, their generality makes
some proofs more difficult: the refinement semantics consider arbitrary postconditions, which
might depend on arbitrary variables. This is overkill. As we show, it suffices to consider
only postconditions whose free variables are all bound in α or β: in comparing two games
(even if their free variables exceed their bound variables) the role of the postcondition is
solely to capture the output behavior of the games. This tightening of the semantics is
important because it allows us to use a tight definition of free variables for refinement
formulas: FV(α ≤[ ] β) = FV(α) ∪ FV(β). Tight definitions of free variables are important
in turn because they ensure our refinement rules are applicable in the widest possible range
of cases.
I Lemma 11 (Domain restriction). The following semantics are equivalent to the semantics
of α ≤ i〈〉 β and α ≤ i[ ] β, respectively:
∀t :S→ Ti FV(t) ⊆ BV(α) ∪ BV(β)→ 〈〈α〉〉 t s→ 〈〈β〉〉 t s
∀t :S→ Ti FV(t) ⊆ BV(α) ∪ BV(β)→ [[α]] t s→ [[β]] t s
That is, quantifying only over postconditions determined by the bound variables of α and β is
sufficient to characterize the refinement relation between α and β.
Proof. We give the cases for α ≤ i〈〉 β and the cases for α ≤ i[ ] β are symmetric. We show that
each version of the semantics implies the other.
The first direction is trivial. Assume pα ≤ i〈〉 β
q
s, so (0) ∀t :S→ Ti 〈〈α〉〉 t s→ 〈〈β〉〉 t s.
Now fix some t ∈ S→ Ti and assume FV(t) ⊆ BV(α) ∪ BV(β) and 〈〈α〉〉 t s. Then by (0)
have 〈〈β〉〉 t s. Thus ∀t :S→ Ti FV(t) ⊆ BV(α) ∪ BV(β)→ 〈〈α〉〉 t s→ 〈〈β〉〉 t s as desired.
We show the converse direction. Assume (0) ∀t :S→ Ti FV(t) ⊆ BV(α) ∪ BV(β) →
〈〈α〉〉 t s → 〈〈β〉〉 t s. Now fix t ∈ S → Ti and assume (1) 〈〈α〉〉 t s. Now define tˆ = (λr :
S. t (set r ~x (s ~x))) where ~x = V \ (BV(α) ∪ BV(β)), where V is the set of all variables. By
construction (2) FV(tˆ) ⊆ BV(α) ∪ BV(β). Note that (3a) (t ∧ ~x = s ~x) r → tˆ r for all r by
arithmetic substitution. and (3b) (tˆ ∧ ~x = s ~x)r → t r for all r by arithmetic substitution.
From (1) by [8, Lem. 11] have 〈〈α〉〉 (t ∧ ~x = s ~x) s, then by monotonicity and (3a) have
〈〈α〉〉 tˆ s. Combined with (2) this satisfies the assumption of (0) so 〈〈β〉〉 tˆ s, then by bound
effect again 〈〈β〉〉 (tˆ ∧ ~x = s ~x) s and by monotonicity and (3b) have 〈〈β〉〉 t s. This held for
all t so finally pα ≤ i〈〉 β
q
s as desired. J
C.2 Substitution
The following lemmas about free variables, renaming, and substitution will be used in the
soundness proof of the proof calculus. These lemmas were all proved inductively for CdGL [8].
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Thus, each of our proofs merely adds to prior inductive proofs a case for the refinement
connective and assumes access to inductive hypotheses.
I Lemma 12 (Formula coincidence). If s = r on FV(Γ) ∪ FV(φ) then given M such that
pΓq s `M :(pφq s) there exists N such that pΓq r ` N :(pφq r). We also prove coincidence
for contexts: If s = r on FV(Γ) and pΓq s is inhabited then pΓq r is inhabited. We also
prove coincidence for the construct (sol, s, d  x′ = f): If s = r on FV(f) ∪ {x} then
(sol, s, d  x′ = f) = (sol, r, d  x′ = f)
Proof. We prove the case for α ≤ i[ ] β, the case for α ≤ i〈〉 β is symmetric, and the other cases
given in prior work [8].
By Lemma11 have pα ≤ i[ ] β
q
s = ∀t :S→ Ti FV(t) ⊆ BV(α) ∪ BV(β) → [[α]] t s →
[[β]] t s and likewise for state r, so it suffices to show that (P0) 〈〈α〉〉 t s = [[α]] t r and (P1)
〈〈β〉〉 t s = [[β]] t r assuming (0) FV(t) ⊆ BV(α)∪BV(β). From (0) have (0A) FV(t) ⊆ BV(α)
and (0B) FV(t) ⊆ BV(β).
Then the IH applies on α and β satisfying (P0) and (P1) as desired. J
I Lemma 13 (Formula uniform renaming). Γ `M :(pφq s) iff Γ yx `M yx :φ yx .
Proof. Recall that renaming x to y also renames x′ to y′.
It suffices to consider Γ = · because, as argued in prior work, pΓq s iff pΓ yxq s yx . We give
the case for α ≤ i[ ] β.
p
α ≤ i[ ] β
q
s
=∀P :S→ Ti [[α]] P s→ [[β]] P s
=IH∀P :S→ Ti [[α yx ]] P yx s yx → [[β yx ]] P yx s yx
=∗∀P :S→ Ti [[α yx ]] P s yx → [[β yx ]] P s yx
=pα yx ≤ i[ ] β yx
q
s yx
=p(α ≤ i[ ] β) yx
q
s yx
where the step marked ∗ holds because transposition renaming · yx is a permutation on S→ Ti
so that P yx
y
x = P .
J
I Lemma 14 (Formula substitution). Recall that sfx is shorthand for set s x (f s). If the
substitutions Γfx and φfx are admissible, then pΓq s `M : pφq sfx iff Γfx s `Mfx s : pφfxq s.
Proof. We prove only the case for α ≤ i[ ] β, since all other cases are proven in prior work [8].
We prove each direction separately. In each direction, IH step applies because formula
substitution and game substitution are proven by simultaneous induction with one another.
We are only showing the new case of this induction.
p
α ≤ i[ ] β
f
x
q
s
→ pαfx ≤ i[ ] βfx
q
s
→ (∀P :S→ Ti ([[αfx]] P s→ [[βfx ]] P s))
→∗ (∀P :S→ Ti ([[αfx]] P fx s→ [[βfx ]] P fx s))
→IH (∀P :S→ Ti ([[α]] P sfx → [[β]] P sfx))
→ pα ≤ i[ ] β
q
sfx
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The step marked ∗ holds because the universe S→ Ti is closed under substitution, so
any universally quantified statement which holds of all P trivially holds of those P which
have form Qfx for some Q.
p
α ≤ i[ ] β
q
sfx
→Dom (∀P :S→ Ti (FV(P ) ⊆ BV(α) ∪ BV(β)→ [[α]] P sfx → [[β]] P sfx))
→IH (∀P :S→ Ti (FV(P ) ⊆ BV(α) ∪ BV(β)→ [[αfx]] P fx s→ [[βfx ]] P fx s))
→BV (∀P :S→ Ti (FV(P ) ⊆ BV(αfx) ∪ BV(βfx )→ [[αfx]] P fx s→ [[βfx ]] P fx s))
→∗ (∀P :S→ Ti (FV(P ) ⊆ BV(αfx) ∪ BV(βfx )→ [[αfx]] P s→ [[βfx ]] P s))
→Dom pαfx ≤ i[ ] βfx
q
s
The steps marked Dom hold by Lemma 11. The step marked BV observes that BV(α) =
BV(αfx) and BV(β) = BV(βfx ) because term substitutions do not introduce or remove bound
variables. To show the step marked ∗, assume an arbitrary P such that FV(P ) ⊆ BV(αfx).
Here P fx refers to the semantic substitution (λs : S. P (sfx)). Since x /∈ BV(α) ∪ BV(β),
then by the variable assumption on P we have that x /∈ FV(P ), thus s = sfx on FV(P ) and
thus by (semantic) Lemma12 have P s = (P fx ) s for all such P which suffices to prove the
step. J
I Corollary 15. If Γ ` φfx is valid then Γ, p : x = f ` φ is valid.
Proof. By Lemma14 and because px = fq φfx holds reflexivity for x /∈ FV(f). J
C.3 Soundness
We now show the main soundness using the previous lemmas.
I Theorem 16 (Soundness of Proof Calculus). If Γ ` φ is provable then Γ ` φ is valid. As a
special case, if (· ` φ) is provable, then φ is valid.
Proof. By induction on the derivation. In each case, fix some state s : S and assume (G)
pΓq s. In each case, fix i ∈ N and P : Ti. In each case, we show some refinement of form
α ≤[ ] β by assuming [α]P to show [β]P .
In every premiss whose context is also Γ, assume modus ponens with assumption (G) has
been applied.
We first mention several derived axioms which we use. The axioms K, Kd, and [ ]∧, while
not sound for all games α , are sound for systems α.
K [α](φ→ ψ)→ [α]φ→ [α]ψ 1
Kd [α](φ→ ψ)→ 〈α〉φ→ 〈α〉ψ 1
[ ]∧ [α]φ ∧ [α]ψ ↔ [α](φ ∧ ψ) 1
1 α is a system
Soundness of K and Kd can be proved sound by an induction on α, then axiom [ ]∧ derives
from K. In classical logics, Kd is derivable from K, but constructively the axioms are
independent.
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Case :=nop We show x := x ∼=?tt by showing (Γ ` [x := x]P ) ↔ (Γ yx , x = y ` P ) ↔1
(Γ, x = y ` P )↔2 (Γ ` P )↔ (Γ ` tt→ P )↔ (Γ ` [?tt]P ) where the step marked 1 holds
because by Corollary 15 and the step marked 2 holds because y was fresh.
Case ∪idem We show α ∪ α ∼= α by showing [α ∪ α]P ↔ [α]P ∧ [α]P ↔ [α]P .
Case ∪c We show α ∪ β ∼= β ∪ α by showing [α ∪ β]P ↔ [α]P ∧ [β]P ↔ [β]P ∧ [α]P ↔
[β ∪ α]P .
Case ∪AWe show {α∪β}∪γ ∼= α∪{β∪γ} by showing [{α ∪ β} ∪ γ]P ↔ [α ∪ β]P ∧ [γ]P ↔
([α]P ∧ [β]P ) ∧ [γ]P ↔ [α]P ∧ ([β]P ∧ [γ]P )↔ [α]P ∧ [β ∪ γ]P ↔ [α ∪ {β ∪ γ}]P .
Case annihl We show ?ff;α ∼=?ff by showing [?ff;α]P ↔ [?ff][α]P ↔ (ff→ [α]P )↔
tt↔ (ff→ P )↔ [?ff]P .
Case DDE We show αdd ∼= α by showing [αdd]P ↔ 〈αd〉P ↔ [α]P .
Case R〈·〉 Assume R(P ) ≤ i by side condition. Assume (D1) Γ ` 〈α〉P and (D2)
Γ ` α ≤ i〈〉 β, i.e., (D2) Γ ` αd ≤ i[ ] βd, i.e., and from (D2) have ∀P : (S→ Ti) [αd]P → [βd]P
and then ∀P : (S→ Ti) 〈α〉P → 〈β〉P by semantics. Since R(P ) ≤ i then pP q s ∈ Ti, so by
specialization and modus ponens on (D1) have 〈β〉P as desired.
Case R[·] Assume R(P ) ≤ i by side condition. Assume (D1) Γ ` [α]P and (D2)
Γ ` α ≤ i[ ] β and from (D2) have ∀P : (S→ Ti) [α]P → [β]P . Since R(P ) ≤ i then
pP q s ∈ Ti, so by specialization and modus ponens on (D1) have [β]P as desired.
Case 〈?〉 Assume (D) φ→ ψ. Then have
〈?φ〉P
↔φ ∧ P
→Dψ ∧ P
↔ = 〈?ψ〉P
so that 〈?φ〉P → 〈?ψ〉P as desired.
Case [?] Assume (D) ψ → φ. Then have
[?φ]P
↔(φ→ P )
→D(ψ → P )
↔[?ψ]P
so that [?φ]P → [?ψ]P as desired.
Case un∗ Assume as a side condition that (SC1) α is a system. Let i be the rank of
the refinement, which as a side condition (SC2) is at least the rank of α and β. Assume
(D) [α∗](α ≤ i[ ] β). Assume (A) [α∗]P to show [β∗]P . By inversion on (D) and (A) there
exist J,K : S → Ti such that (D1) Γ ` J (D2) J ` [α]J (D3) J ` α ≤ i[ ] β (A1) Γ ` K
(A2) K ` [α]K (A3) K ` P . We show [β∗]P by [∗]I with invariant J ∧K. The first premiss
Γ ` J ∧K is immediate by (D1) and (A1). The third premiss J ∧K ` P is immediate by
(A3). The second premiss is J ∧K ` [β](J ∧K). By (D3) we have J ∧K ` α ≤ i[ ] β so we
apply R[·], which is applicable because J ∧K has rank i by (SC2). Then by soundness of
R[·] it suffices to show J ∧K ` [α](J ∧K). By (SC1), α is a system so axiom K applies,
thus J ∧K ` [α](J ∧K) holds by (D2) and (A2).
Case rolll To show ?tt ∪ {α;α∗} ∼= α∗ we show each direction of the equivalence.
We show the left-to-right case: Assume (A) [?tt ∪ {α;α∗}]P to show [α∗]P . From [∪]E1
and [∪]E2 on (A) have (A1) [?tt]P and (A2) [α;α∗]P . Respectively, from (A1) have (A3) P
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by [?]I and modus ponens on verum tt, then from (A2) have (A4) [α][α∗]P by 〈[;]〉E. From
(A2) and (A4) by [∗]r have [α∗]P as desired.
We show the right-to-left case: Assume (A) [α∗]P to show [?tt ∪ α;α∗]P . By [∗]E on (A)
have (A1) P and (A2) [α][α∗]P . Then respectively have (A3) [?tt]P by weakening and [?]I
on (A1), and (A4) [α;α∗]P by 〈[;]〉I on (A2). By [∪]I on (A3) and (A4) have [?tt ∪ α;α∗]P
as desired.
Case 〈:∗〉 Have p〈x := f〉P q s→ P (set s x (f s))→ Σv : R. P (set s x v)→ p〈x := ∗〉P q s.
Case [:∗] Have p[x := ∗]P q s→ Πv : R. P (set s x v)→ P (set s x (f s))→ p[x := f ]P q s.
Case ;S Assume (SC) α1 is a system. Assume (D1) α1 ≤[ ] α2 and (D2) [α1](β1 ≤[ ] β2)
and (A) [α1;β1]P to show [α2;β2]P . From (A) by 〈[;]〉E have (1) [α1][β1]P . Axiom K is
applicable to (D2) and (1) because of (SC), yielding (2) [α1](β1 ≤[ ] β2 ∧ [β1]P ). Then by
M and R[·] have (3) [α1][β2]P . By R[·] on the postcondition β1 ≤[ ] β2 ∧ [β1]P from (3) and
(D1) have (4) [α2][β2]P, so by 〈[;]〉I have [α2;β2]P as desired.
Case ;G Assume (D1) α1 ≤[ ] α2 and (D2) · ` β1 ≤[ ] β2. Then from (A) have [α1][β1]P .
Apply R[·] with (D1) to get (1) [α2][β1]P . Since (D2) is valid then plug in P to get that (2)
[β1]P ` [β2]P . Then monotonicity M on (1) and (2) gives [α2][β2]P which immediately gives
[α2;β2]P by 〈[;]〉I as desired.
Case [∪]R Assume (D1) α ≤[ ] β and (D2) α ≤[ ] γ and (A) [α]P so by R[·] on (D1) and
(D2) have [β]P and [γ]P so that [β ∪ γ]P as desired, so that α ≤[ ] β ∪ γ.
Case trans Assume (D1) Γ ` α ≤[ ] β and (D2) Γ ` β ≤[ ] γ. Want to show Γ ` α ≤[ ] γ.
(A) [α]P . From (D1) and (D2) have [α]P → [β]P and [β]P → [γ]P so by modus ponens
twice from (A) have [γ]P, so finally [α]P → [γ]P, i.e., α ≤[ ] γ.
Case refl Want to show Γ ` α ≤[ ] α. Assume (A) [α]P so [α]P by hyp, thus [α]P → [α]P,
i.e., α ≤[ ] α.
Case ;A Each step is reversible so that this case is an equivalence {α;β}; γ ∼= α;β; γ.
[{α;β}; γ]P ↔ [α;β][γ]P ↔ [α][β][γ]P ↔∗ [α][β; γ]P ↔ [α; {β; γ}]P where step (*) also uses
M and every step uses 〈[;]〉I or 〈[;]〉E.
Case :=:= Assume side condition x /∈ FV(g). Then note (set s x (f s)) = s on FV(g){
by [8, Lem. 11], then by [8, Lem. 10] have (1) g (set s x (f s)) = g s
p[x := f ;x := g]P q s
↔p[x := f ][x := g]P q s
↔p[x := g]P q (set s x (f s))
↔P (set (set s x (f s)) x (g (set s x (f s))))
↔1P (set (set s x (f s)) x (g s))
↔P (set s x (g s))
↔p[x := g]P q s
Case ;dr p[(α ∪ β); γ]P q s↔ p[α ∪ β][γ]P q s↔ p[α][γ]P q s*p[β][γ]P q s↔ p[α; γ]P q s*p[β; γ]P q s↔
p[{α; γ} ∪ {β; γ}]P q s
Case [∪]L1 Since [[α ∪ β]] P s→ [[α]] P s*[[β]] P s→ [[α]] P s.
Case [∪]L2 Since [[α ∪ β]] P s→ [[α]] P s*[[β]] P s→ [[β]] P s.
Case 〈∪〉R1 Since [αd]P → 〈α〉P → 〈α ∪ β〉P → [{α ∪ β}d]P
Case 〈∪〉R2 Since [βd]P → 〈β〉P → 〈α ∪ β〉P → [{α ∪ β}d]P
Case ;idl [?tt;α]P ↔ [?tt][α]P ↔?tt→ [α]P ↔ [α]P
Case skipd [skip]P ↔ [?tt]P ↔ tt→ P ↔ P ↔ tt∧P ↔ 〈?tt〉P ↔ [?ttd]P ↔ [skipd]P
Case ;d [{α;β}d]P ↔ 〈α;β〉P ↔ 〈α〉〈β〉P ↔ 〈α〉[βd]P ↔ [αd][βd]P ↔ [αd;βd]P
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Case :=d p[x := fd]P q s↔ p〈x := f〉P q s↔ P (set s x (f s))↔ p[x := f ]P q s
CaseDC Assume (D) [x′ = f &φ]ψ. We wish to show p[x′ = f &φ]P q s↔ p[x′ = f &φ ∧ ψ]P q s.
Show the forward implication, then converse implication.
Forward implication: Assume (A)
p[x′ = f &φ]P q s =
Πd : R≥0.Πsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
→ (Πt : [0, d]. pφq (set s x (sol t)))
→ P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
Want to show
p[x′ = f &φ ∧ ψ]P q s =
Πd : R≥0.Πsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
→ (Πt : [0, d]. pφ ∧ ψq (set s x (sol t)))
→ P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
So assume (B1) (sol, s, d  x′ = f) and (B2) (Πt : [0, d]. pφ ∧ ψq (set s x (sol t))) then by
left projection have (B3) (Πt : [0, d]. pφq (set s x (sol t))). By applying (B1) and (B3) to (A)
have P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))) as desired.
Converse implication: Assume (A)
p[x′ = f &φ ∧ ψ]P q s =
Πd : R≥0.Πsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
→ (Πt : [0, d]. pφ ∧ ψq (set s x (sol t)))
→ P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
Want to show
p[x′ = f &φ]P q s =
Πd : R≥0.Πsol : [0, d]→ R.
(sol, s, d  x′ = f)
→ (Πt : [0, d]. pφq (set s x (sol t)))
→ P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d))))
So assume (B1) (sol, s, d  x′ = f) and (B2) (Πt : [0, d]. pφq (set s x (sol t))). Now
for every t ∈ [0, d] have pψq (set s x (sol t)) from (D) because solutions and domain-
constraints are prefix-closed: from (B1) and (B2) have (C1) (sol, s, t  x′ = f) and (C2)
(Πr : [0, t]. pφq (set s x (sol r))). That is, (B3) (Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t))). By conjunc-
tion (B2) have (B4) (Πt : [0, d]. pφ ∧ ψq (set s x (sol t))). Applying (B1) and (B4) to (A)
have P (set s (x, x′) (sol d, f (set s x (sol d)))) as desired.
Case DW Assume (A)p[x := ∗;x′ := f ; ?ψ]P q s so that p[x := ∗][x′ := f ][?ψ]P q s and (A1)
Πv : R. (pψq (set (set s x v) x′ (f (set s x v)))→ pP q (set (set s x v) x′ (f (set s x v))))
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To show [x′ = f &ψ]P we assume some d > 0 and sol such that (B1) (sol, s, d  x′ = f)
(B2) (Πt : [0, d]. pψq (set s x (sol t))). Specialize (B2) to t = d so pψq (set s x (sol d)) and apply
Lemma 12 since x′ /∈ FV(ψ) by syntactic constraints so (C) pψq (set (set s x (sol d)) x′ (f set s x (sol d))).
Specialize (A1) to v = sol d and apply (C) yielding pP q (set (set s x (sol d)) x′ (f (set s x (sol d))))
as desired.
Case SOL Assume side condition (SC1) that term {x, x′, t, t′} ∩ FV(d) = ∅, so by [8,
Lem. 10] we know that the value of term d is constant, i.e., d s = d (set s (x, t) (sol r, r)) =
d (set s (x, t, x′, t′) (sol r, r, f (set s (x, t) (sol r, r)), 1)) for all r. Throughout this case we
write dˆ for the real number d s.
Assume side condition that sln solves the ODE on [0, d] meaning there exists function
sol such that (SC2) sol (s t) = sln s for states s such that s t ∈ [0, dˆ] and (sol, s, dˆ 
t′ = 1, x′ = f). Assume (G1) t = 0 (G2) d ≥ 0 (D) [t := ∗; ?0 ≤ t ≤ d;x := sln]ψ and (A)
[t := d; ?t ≥ 0;x := sln;x′ := f ; t′ := a1]P so that (A1)
P (set s (x, x′, t, t′) (sln (set s t dˆ), f (set (x, t) (sln (set s t dˆ)) ), dˆ, 1))
Want to show [t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψd]P, i.e., 〈t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ〉P for which it suffices to show
for some sol and d (specifically sol and d above) that (P1) (sol, s, dˆ  t′ = 1, x′ = f) (P2)
(Πr : [0, dˆ]. pψq (set s (x, t) (sol r, r)))
(P3) P (set s (x, t, x′, t′) (sol dˆ, dˆ, f (set s (x, t) (sol dˆ, dˆ)), 1))
(P1) is immediate by (SC2). To show (P2), note from (D) have
Πr : [0, dˆ]. pψq (set s (t, x) (r, sln (set s t r)))
=Πr : [0, dˆ]. pψq (set s (x, t) (sln (set s t r), r))
=SC2Πr : [0, dˆ]. pψq (set s (x, t) (sol r, r))
which is (P2) as desired.
Then (P3) follows from (A1) by specializing t = d and since by (SC2) sln (set s t d) = sol dˆ.
This completes the case.
Case DG Assume side condition that (SC) y is fresh in y0, f, a, b, ψ. Assume (A)
p[y := y0;x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]P q s to show
p[x′ = f &ψ; y := ∗d; y′ := ∗d]P q s. Let
Q ≡ (∃y ∃y′ P ). From (A) have p[x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]P q (set s y (y0 s)) With
witness y = (y0 s) then have (1) p∃y [x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]P q s and by M since
trivially pP q s→ p∃y ∃y′ P q s = pQq s then have (2) p∃y [x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]Qq s.
By (SC) and because y and y′ are not free variables of Q, then rule DG applies to (2) yielding
(3) p[x′ = f &ψ]Qq s. Then note for all states t : S that
pQq t
→ 〈〈y := ∗; y′ := ∗〉〉 P t
↔ [[{y := ∗; y′ := ∗}d]] P t
by 〈[d]〉I, 〈[;]〉I, and 〈:∗〉I so by M on (3) have p[x′ = f &ψ]Qq s = p[x′ = f &ψ][{y := ∗; y′ := ∗}d]P q s =
p[x′ = f &ψ; {y := ∗; y′ := ∗}d]P q s as desired.
Case R〈∗〉 This case is actually part of the inductive proof of Theorem10. Assume (D1)
Γ ` J and (D2) J,M0 =M  0 ` 〈α〉(J ∧M0 M) and (A) [αˆ∗;β]P = [αˆ∗][β]P to prove
[γ]P . Here αˆ, β, and γ are defined as
αˆ ≡?M  0; {αd mod IS}
β ≡?M = 0
γ ≡ α∗d
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From (D1) and (D2), we can apply the inlining IH to get: J,M  0 ` αd mod IS ≤[ ] αd
and by [?]I then (IH) J,M  0 ` αˆ ≤[ ] αd. By Theorem9 also have (T) J,M  0 `
[αˆ](J ∧M0 M).
Prove 〈α∗〉P with metricM and invariant J ∧ [α∗][β]P . Show each premiss.
(P1) Γ ` J ∧ [αˆ∗][β]P holds by (D1) and (A). (P2) J ∧ [α∗][β]P,M0 =M  0 `
〈α〉(J ∧ [αˆ∗][β]P ∧M0  M). By 〈[d]〉I the modalities 〈α〉 and [αd] are equivalent, so it
suffices to show J ∧ [αˆ∗][β]P,M0 =M  0 ` [αd](J ∧ [αˆ∗][β]P ∧M0  M). Note (IH)
applies since J and M  0 are assumed in the context, thus by R[·] it suffices to show
(BR) J ∧ [αˆ∗][β]P,M0 =M  0 ` [αˆ](J ∧ [αˆ∗][β]P ∧M0 M). Recall by Theorem8 that
αˆ is a system and so admits axiom [ ]∧. By [ ]∧ on (BR) and by (D2) it suffices to show
J ∧ [αˆ∗][β]P ,M0 =M  0 ` [αˆ]([αˆ∗][β]P ). which is the right projection of assumption
[αˆ∗][β]P .
(P3) J ∧ [α∗][β]P,M = 0 ` P . By left conjunct of [α∗][β]P have [?M = 0]P so by modus
ponens onM = 0 have P . J
C.4 Inlining
We now show the results on inlining. Systemhood is a lemma to transfer, which is a lemma to
refinement. Recall that Γ, α, φ, andM are in the system-test fragment of CdGL. A system-test
formula or context does not mention diamond modalities nor box game modalities. A system-
test game has only system-test formulas in tests and domain constraints. A system-test
proof only ever introduces system-test formulas and games in the context. A proof of a
system-test game is not automatically system-test, e.g., if it mentions a game in a cut. The
system-test requirement can be relaxed so that diamond and game formulas are allowed if
they are trivially equivalent to some system-test formula. The only case in which we thus
relax the system-test requirement is 〈∪〉E: intuitively, we wish to provide a case analysis
rule for system-test disjunctions φ ∨ ψ, but because disjunctions are derived from choices,
we instead consider a rule which eliminates some choice 〈?φ∪?ψ〉ρ, trivially equivalent to
(φ ∨ ψ) ∧ ρ.
I Theorem 17 (Systemhood). αmodM is a system, i.e., it does not contain dualities.
Proof. Induction on M . In the hypothesis case, it suffices that Γ is system-test. In each
case, the IH applies because renaming, assignment, and (system) tests preserve the fact
that Γ is system-test. In each case the right-hand side of M mod α does not contain ·d by
inspection. J
I Theorem 18 (Inlining transfer). If Γ `M : [α]φ for system-test Γ,M, and hybrid game α
then Γ ` [αmodM ]φ.
Proof. By induction on the normal natural deduction proof M . Let (SC) denote the side
condition that α and Γ are system-test.
Case hyp Let p denote the (variable) proof term for hyp. Then p : [α]φ for system α and
αmod p = α and α ≤[ ] α reflexively.
Case 〈∪〉E As discussed in SectionC.4, rule 〈∪〉E is not system-test in the strictest sense,
but the only case we truly need in practice is ?φ∪?ψ ∩ ρ which is system-test in the relaxed
sense that it is everywhere equivalent to (φ ∨ ψ) ∧ ρ, which is system-test assuming φ, ψ, ρ
are system-test. Here we give the system-test case of 〈∪〉E and assume that only system
tests are used in (the normal forms of) proofs. L may be an arbitrary game with arbitrary
postcondition Post. Note that general cases are allowed to appear in proofs so long as they
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are eliminated during normalization. Even in normal forms, the general-purpose choice game
introduction rule may also be used, just not its elimination.
Assume (D1) Γ ` 〈?φ∪?ψ〉ρ, Γ, 〈?φ〉ρ ` [L]Post, and Γ, 〈?ψ〉ρ ` [L]Post. where the latter
two are definitionally equivalent to (D2) Γ, φ ∧ ρ ` [L]Post and (D3) Γ, ψ ∧ ρ ` [L]Post
In this case
Lmod 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 = {?φ ∧ ρ; {LmodB}} ∪ {?ψ ∧ ρ; {Lmod C}}
so it suffices to show [{?φ ∧ ρ; {LmodB}} ∪ {?ψ ∧ ρ; {Lmod C}}]Post
By the IHs on (D2) and (D3) have (B2) Γ, φ ∧ ρ ` [LmodB]Post (B3) Γ, ψ ∧ ρ `
[Lmod C]Post so by [?]I and 〈[;]〉I have (2) Γ ` [?φ ∧ ρ; {LmodB}]Post (3) Γ ` [?ψρ; {Lmod C}]Post
and by [∪]I have Γ ` [{?φ ∧ ρ; {LmodB}} ∪ {?ψ ∧ ρ; {Lmod C}}]Post as desired.
Case 〈∪〉E holds vacuously because a proof term of 〈∪〉E is never system-test: it always
introduces a diamond formula to the context. The fact that 〈∪〉E proofs are non-system-test
should not pose any practical limitations to completeness: case analysis in normal forms is
predominantly used to inspect the state. If a proof of 〈α∗〉φ depends on the state, it does so
through some termination metricM, which can be expressed with a disjunctive case 〈∪〉E.
Case [∪]I In this case {{α ∪ β};L}mod (M,N) = {{α;L}modM} ∪ {{β;L}modN}.
Assume (D) Γ ` [α ∪ β]φ so (D1) Γ ` [α]φ and (D2) Γ ` [β]φ.
By the IHs have (B1) Γ ` [{α;L}modM ]φ (B2) Γ ` [{β;L}modN ]φ so by [∪]I have Γ
` [{{α;L}modM} ∪ {{β;L}modM}]φ.
Case 〈?〉I In this case {?ψd;L}mod (M,N) = LmodN . Assume (D) Γ ` 〈?ψ〉[L]φ so
(D1) Γ ` ψ and (D2) Γ ` [L]φ. By the IH on (D2) have Γ ` [LmodN ]φ as desired.
Case [?]I In this case {?ψ;L} mod (λq : ψ. M) = {?ψ; {L modM}}. Assume (D) Γ
` [?ψ][L]φ so that (D1) Γ, ψ ` [L]φ. Since ?ψ and Γ are system-test, Γ, ψ is too and the
IH applies giving Γ, ψ ` [LmodM ]φ. Then by [?]I and 〈[;]〉I have Γ ` [?ψ][LmodM ]φ and
Γ ` [?ψ; {LmodM}]φ by 〈[;]〉I as desired.
Case 〈∪〉IL In this case {{α ∪ β}d;L} mod ` ·M = {αd;L} modM . Assume (D) Γ
` 〈α ∪ β〉[L]φ, with premiss (D1) Γ ` 〈α〉[L]φ = Γ ` [αd;L]φ. By the IH on (D1) have Γ
` [{αd;L}modM ]φ as desired.
Case 〈∗〉S In this case {α∗d;L}mod ` ·M = LmodM . Assume (D) Γ ` 〈α∗〉[L]φ with
premiss (D1) Γ ` [L]φ. By the IH on (D1) have Γ ` [LmodM ]φ as desired.
Case 〈∪〉IR In this case {{α ∪ β}d;L} mod r ·M = {βd;L} mod M Assume (D) Γ
` 〈α ∪ β〉[L]φ, with premiss (D1) Γ ` 〈β〉[L]φ = Γ ` [βd;L]φ. By the IH on (D1) have Γ
` [{βd;L}modM ]φ as desired.
Case 〈∗〉G In this case {α∗d;L}modr ·M = {α;α∗d;L}modM Assume (D) Γ ` 〈α∗〉[L]φ,
with premiss (D1) Γ ` 〈α〉〈α∗〉[L]φ = Γ ` [{α;α∗}d;L]φ. By the IH on (D1) have Γ
` [{α;α∗d;L}modM ]φ as desired.
Case [:∗] In this case {x := ∗;L}mod (λx : R. M) = x := ∗; {LmodM}.
Assume (D) Γ ` [x := ∗][L]φ with premiss (D1) Γ yx ` [L]φ Since Γ yx is system-test, the IH
applies and Γ yx ` [LmodM ]φ so by [:∗] and 〈[;]〉I have Γ ` [x := ∗; {LmodM}]φ as desired.
Case 〈:∗〉I In this case {x := ∗d;L}mod 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 = x := f ; {LmodM}.
Assume (D) Γ ` 〈x := ∗〉[L]φ with premiss (D1) Γ yx , x = f yx ` [L]φ. Note Γ yx , x = f yx is
system-test. By the IH on (D1) have (B1) Γ yx , x = f
y
x ` [LmodM ]φ so by 〈[: =]〉I and 〈[;]〉I
have Γ ` [x := f ; {LmodM}]φ as desired.
Case 〈[;]〉I In this case {{α;β};L}mod 〈[ι M ]〉 = {α; {β;L}}modM .
Assume (D) Γ ` [α;β][L]φ with premiss (D1) Γ ` [{α;β};L]φ = Γ ` [α; {β;L}]φ so by
IH Γ ` [{α; {β;L}}modM ]φ as desired.
Case 〈[: =]〉I In this case {x := f ;L}mod 〈[x := f yx in p. M ]〉 = x := f ; {LmodM}.
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Assume (D) Γ ` [x := f ][L]φ with premiss (D1) Γ yx , x = f yx ` [L]φ. Note context
Γ yx , x = f
y
x is system-test. By the IH on (D1) have (B1) Γ
y
x , x = f
y
x ` [LmodM ]φ so by
〈[: =]〉I and 〈[;]〉I have Γ ` [x := f ; {LmodM}]φ as desired.
Case [∗]I In this case {α∗;L} mod M rep p : J. N in O = {αmodN}∗; {L mod O}.
Assume (D) Γ ` [α∗;L]φ with premisses (D1) Γ ` J (D2) p : J ` [α]J (D3) p : J ` [L]φ. The
system-test condition says that J does not contain game or diamond modalities.
By IH on (D2) have (B2) p : J ` [αmodN ]J and by IH on (D3) have (B3) p : J
` [LmodO]φ so by [∗]I on (D1) (B2) (B3) have Γ ` [{αmodN}∗][LmodO]φ so by 〈[;]〉I have
Γ ` [{αmodN}∗; {LmodO]φ}.
Case 〈∗〉I In this case {α∗d;L}modfor(M : ϕ(M); q.N ;O){α} = {?M≥ 0; {αd modN}}∗; ?M =
0; {L mod O}. Assume (D) Γ ` 〈α∗〉[L]φ with premisses (D1) Γ ` ϕ (D2) p : ϕ, q : M0 =
M  0 ` 〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M) (D3) p : ϕ, q :M = 0 ` [L]φ. The system-test condition says
that ϕ does not contain game or diamond modalities.
By the IH on (D2) have (B2) p : ϕ, q :M0 =M  0 ` [αmodN ](ϕ ∧M0 M). By
the IH on (D3) have (B3) p : ϕ, q :M = 0 ` [LmodO]φ
In this case it suffices to show Γ ` [{?M  0; {αmod }}∗][?M = 0][LmodO]φ, which
we show by [∗]I with loop invariant ϕ by showing premisses (P1) Γ ` ϕ (P2) p : ϕ `
[?M  0; {αmodN}]ϕ (P3) p : ϕ ` [?M = 0][LmodO]φ.
(P1) holds immediately by (D1). To show (P2) it suffices by 〈[;]〉I and [?]I to show
p : ϕ, q : M  0 ` [αmodN ]ϕ, then since M0 is fresh it suffices by discrete ghost iG to
show ϕ,M0 = M  0 ` [αmodN ]ϕ, which follows from (B2) by M and projection. To
show (P3) it suffices by [?]I to show p : ϕ, q :M = 0 ` [LmodO]φ, which is (B3).
This completes case 〈∗〉I.
Case DI In a normal-form proof, DI only occurs on the left premiss of DC, and the DC
proof does not apply the IH on theleft premiss, thus no case for DI is needed.
CaseDC In this case have {x′ = f &ψ;L}modDC(M : R,N)) = {x′ = f &ψ ∧ ρ;L}modN .
Assume (D) Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ][L]φ with premisses (D1) Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ]R and (D2)
(Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ ∧R][L]φ) ↔ (Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ ∧R;L]φ). By IH on (D2) have (B2) Γ
` [{x′ = f &ψ ∧R;L}modN ]φ as desired.
Case DW In this case have {x′ = f &ψ;L}modDW (M) = x := ∗;x′ := f ; ?ψ; {LmodM}.
Assume (D) Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ]φ with premiss (D1) Γ ` ∀x ∀x′ (ψ → φ). By specializing x′ = f
(where x′ /∈ FV(f) by syntactic condition) under quantifier ∀x have (1) Γ ` ∀x (ψ → φ)fx′ .
By Corollary 15 on (1) have (2) Γ, x′ = f ` ∀x (ψ → φ).
Want to show Γ ` x := ∗;x′ := f ; ?ψ; {LmodM}, and by 〈[;]〉I, [:∗], 〈[: =]〉I, and [?]I suffices
to show Γ yx , x′ = f, ψ ` LmodM which is immediate from (2) by [:∗].
Case DG In this case
{x′ = f &ψ; {y := ∗; y′ := ∗}d;L}modDG(y0, a, b,M)
=y := f0; {{x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L}modM}
Assume (D) Γ ` [x′ = f &ψ;L]φ with premiss (D1) Γ ` ∃y [x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L]φ.
By the existential property, there exists f (called y0 in the DG proof term) such that
Γ zy , y = f
z
y ` [x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ]φ. By the IH, have (B1) Γ zy , y = f zy `
[{x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L}modM ]φ and by 〈[: =]〉I and 〈[;]〉I have
Γ ` [y := f ; {{x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L}modM}]φ
as desired.
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Case 〈′〉 In this case
{t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψd;L}modAS(d, sol, dom,M)
={t := d;x := sln;x′ := f}; {LmodM}
Assume (D) Γ ` 〈x′ = f &ψ〉[L]φ with premiss Γ ` ∃t :R≥0 ((∀s : [0, t] 〈t := s;x := sln〉ψ)∧
〈x := sln;x′ := f〉[L]φ). By the Existential Property [8, Lem. 15], the existential is witnessed
by some value d : R of t. The right conjunct of the witness is (D1) Γ ` (〈x := sln;x′ := f〉[L]φ)dt
which by 〈[;]〉E and 〈[: =]〉E twice (and because x′ /∈ FV(f, sln yx ,Γ yx )) gives (1A) Γ yx , x =
sln yx , x
′ = f ` [L]φdt and by Corollary 15 gives (1) Γ yx , t = d, x = sln yx , x′ = f ` [L]φ so that
by IH and freshness on t have (B1) Γ yx , t = d, x = sln
y
x , x
′ = f ` [LmodM ]φ so by 〈[: =]〉I and
〈[;]〉I have Γ ` [t := d;x := sln;x′ := f ; {LmodM}]φ↔ Γ ` [{t := d;x := sln;x′ := f}; {LmodM}]φ
as desired.
Case [′] In this case
{t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ;L}modDS(sol, λd dom. M)
=t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ; {LmodM}
Assume (D) Γ ` t := 0; [t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ][L]φ with t fresh in Γ. with premiss Γ, t = 0
` ∀r :R≥0 ((∀s : [0, r] [r := s; (t, x) := sln]ψ) → [(t, x) := sln;x′ := f ][L]φ), which gives by
inversion (and assuming r fresh) (D1) Γ yx , r ≥ 0, (∀s : [0, r] [r := s; (t, x) := sln]ψ), x = sln yx `
[L]φ. Note that the unique solution t(r) for t′ = 1 is trivially t(r) = t(0) + r by integration,
which simplifies to t(r) = r because t = 0 initially. Thus sln always assigns t = r, so the
variables t and r can be identified with one another, writing xsln for the x component of
sln: (D2) Γ yx , t ≥ 0, (∀s : [0, t] [t := s;x := xsln]ψ), x = xsln yx ` [L]φ. By the IH on (D2)
have (B1) Γ yx , t ≥ 0, (∀s : [0, t] [t := s;x := xsln]ψ), x = xsln yx ` [LmodM ]φ and by [?]I
and 〈[: =]〉I and 〈[;]〉I gives Γ, t = 0 ` [t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ][LmodM ]φ which by 〈[: =]〉I, side
condition, and 〈[;]〉I gives Γ ` [t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ][LmodM ]φ as desired. J
I Theorem 19 (Inlining refinement). If Γ `M : [α]φ for system-test Γ,M, and hybrid game
α then Γ ` αmodM ≤[ ] α.
Proof. By induction on the normal natural deduction proof M . In the case of a sequential
composition α;β or duality αd we must further case-analyze on α and its proof. However, to
avoid duplicating cases, we note that every atomic game α is equivalent to α; skip. Thus we
give cases only for sequential compositions, from which the “atomic” cases are immediate
corrollaries. We write L for the “list” of programs which might follow in each case.
Case 〈∪〉E In this case have Γ ` A : (φ ∨ ψ) and
αmod 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 = {?φ; {LmodB}} ∪ {?ψ; {Lmod C}}
and want to show
{?φ; {LmodB}} ∪ {?ψ; {Lmod C}} ≤[ ] L
By the IHs on B and C have: (1) Γ, φ ` LmodB ≤[ ] L and (2) Γ, ψ ` LmodC ≤[ ] L. Note
;S applies for systems ?φ and ?ψ. By ;S and [∪]R it suffices to show
{?φ;L} ∪ {?ψ;L} ≤[ ] L
which we show:
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{?φ;L} ∪ {?ψ;L}
≤[ ]{?φ∪?ψ};L by ;dr
≤[ ]?(φ ∨ ψ);L def. of ∨
≤[ ]skip;L by (A) and [?]
≤[ ]L by ;idl
This completes the case for 〈∪〉E.
The next two cases 〈[;]〉I and 〈[: =]〉I hold symmetrically for both Angel and Demon.
Case 〈[;]〉I
{{α;β};L}modM = {α; {β;L}}modM
The IH is applicable with proofM because [[{α;β};L]] = [[α; {β;L}]]. By the IH {α; {β;L}}modM ≤[ ]
α; {β;L}. By ;A {α;β};L ∼=[·] α; {β;L} so by trans have {α; {β;L}}modM ≤[ ] {α;β};L as
desired.
Case 〈[: =]〉I
{x := f ;L}mod 〈[x := f yx in p. M ]〉 = {x := f ; {LmodM}}
The proof follows by ;S on system x := f , a rule with two premisses. The first premiss of
;S Γ ` x := f ≤[ ] x := f is immediate by refl
We show the second premiss y Γ ` [x := f ](L modM ≤[ ] L). The IH applies because
by inversion (Γx0x , x = fx0x ) ` M : [L]φ, yielding (Γx0x , x = fx0x ) ` LmodM ≤[ ] L, then by
〈[: =]〉I have Γ ` [x := f ]LmodM ≤[ ] L, which suffices.
We now give the Angel cases.
Case 〈:∗〉I
{x := ∗d;L}mod 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 = {x := f ; {LmodM}}
By ;S on system x := f, suffices to show Γ ` x := f ≤[ ] x := ∗d (which holds immediately by
〈:∗〉, trans, and :=d) and Γ ` [x := f ](LmodM ≤[ ] L) which follows by 〈:∗〉I from the IH on
L, i.e., from Γx0x , x = fx0x ` LmodM ≤[ ] M .
Case 〈?〉I
{?ψd;L}mod (M,N) = LmodN
By trans and ;idl it suffices to show Γ ` skip; {LmodN} ≤[ ]?ψd;L. Then by ;S on system
skip it suffices to show (L) Γ ` skip ≤[ ]?ψd and (R) Γ ` [?ψd](LmodN ≤[ ] L).
To show (L) it suffices by skipd to show Γ ` skipd ≤[ ]?ψd, which holds by 〈?〉 because
Γ ` (tt→ ψ) follows propositionally from Γ `M : ψ. To show (R), it suffices to apply the
IH on L giving Γ ` LmodN ≤[ ] N, then by 〈?〉I and M : ψ have Γ ` [?ψd](LmodN ≤[ ] N).
Case 〈∪〉IL
{{α ∪ β}d;L}mod ` ·M = {αd;L}modM
By the IH, Γ ` {αd;L} modM ≤[ ] αd;L, so by trans it suffices to show Γ ` αd;L ≤[ ]
{α ∪ β}d;L. This follows by ;G because (L) Γ ` αd ≤[ ] {α ∪ β}d and (R) · ` L ≤[ ] L.
Premiss (L) holds by 〈∪〉R1. Premiss (R) holds by refl L ≤[ ] L.
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Case 〈∪〉IR
{{α ∪ β}d;L}mod r ·M = {βd;L}modM
By the IH, Γ ` {βd;L} mod M ≤[ ] βd;L, so by trans it suffices to show Γ ` βd;L ≤[ ]
{α ∪ β}d;L. This follows by ;G because (L) Γ ` βd ≤[ ] {α ∪ β}d and (R) · ` L ≤[ ] L.
Premiss (L) holds by 〈∪〉R2. Premiss (R) holds by refl L ≤[ ] L.
Case 〈∗〉S
{{α∗}d;L}mod ` ·M = LmodM
Symmetric with case 〈∪〉IL. By the IH, Γ ` L mod M ≤[ ] L so by trans it suffices to
show Γ ` L ≤[ ] {α∗}d;L. This follows by ;S on system skip because (L) Γ ` skip ≤[ ] α∗d
and (R) Γ ` [α∗d](L ≤[ ] L). Premiss (L) holds by rolll and 〈∪〉R1. Premiss (R) holds by
monotonicity M on M : 〈α∗d;L〉φ which by 〈[;]〉I equivalently proves 〈α∗d〉〈L〉φ since have
p : 〈L〉φ ` L ≤[ ] L by refl L ≤[ ] L and by weakening.
Case 〈∗〉G
{α∗d;L}mod r ·M = {αd; {α∗}d;L}modM
Symmetric with case 〈∪〉IR. By the IH, Γ ` {αd;α∗d;L}modM ≤[ ] αd;α∗d;L so by trans
it suffices to show Γ ` αd;α∗d;L ≤[ ] L, more simply Γ ` {αd;α∗d};L ≤[ ] L by ;A.
This follows by ;G because (L) Γ ` αd;α∗d ≤[ ] α∗d and (R) ·L ≤[ ] L. Premiss (L) holds
by rolll and 〈∪〉R2. Premiss (R) holds by refl L ≤[ ] L.
Case 〈∗〉I
{α∗d;L}mod for(M : ϕ(M); q.N ;O){α} = {?M  0; {{αd}modN}}∗; ?M = 0; {LmodO}
In this case we use the following abbreviations:
αˆ ≡?M  0; {αd modN}
β ≡?M = 0
γ ≡ α∗d
We will rely on the following refinement rule. Its soundness proof is presented as a case of
the main soundness proof, but is technically part of the present simultaneous induction. We
present this rule only in the appendix because it is much more special-case than the other
refinement rules.
R〈∗〉 Γ ` J J,M0 =M  0 ` 〈α〉(J ∧M0 M)Γ ` αˆ∗;β ≤[ ] γ
Where J and M are per the proof (A) 〈α∗〉φ. From (A) we have (A1) Γ ` J and (A2)
J,M0 =M  0 ` 〈α〉(J ∧M0 M) and (A3) J,M = 0 ` [L]φ.
We repack (B) 〈α∗〉(J ∧M = 0) by 〈∗〉I on (A1) and (A2) proving the postcondition by
hyp.
The proof starts with ;S on system αˆ∗;β, with premisses (L) Γ ` αˆ∗;β ≤[ ] α∗d and (R)
Γ ` [αˆ∗;β]LmodO ≤[ ] L.
Premiss (L) is by R〈∗〉 on (A1) and (A2). We show (R). By Theorem9 on (B) then
Γ ` [α∗d modB](J ∧ M = 0) and by inspection α∗d mod B = α∗d mod A so (C) Γ `
XX:36 Refining Constructive Hybrid Games
[αˆ∗;β](J ∧M = 0). By IH on (A3) have J,M = 0 ` LmodO ≤[ ] L. Then by M on (C) and
(A3) have Γ ` [αˆ∗;β]LmodO ≤[ ] L, satisfying the premiss and completing the case.
Case 〈′〉 In this case the refinement is
{t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψd;L}modAS(d, sol, dom,M) =
{t := d;x := sln;x′ := f ; t′ := 1}; {LmodM}
By premisses of 〈′〉 have (D1) Γ ` d ≥ 0. (D2) Γ ` ((∀r : [0, d] 〈t := r;x := sln〉ψ))
and (D3) 〈t := d;x := sln;x′ := f〉. By :=:= suffices to show Γ ` t := 0; t := d;x :=
sln;x′ := f}; {L mod M} ≤[ ] t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψd;L The proof continues with ap-
plying ;S twice on systems t := 0 and t := d;x := sln;x′ := f . The first premiss is
t := 0 ≤[ ] t := 0 which proves trivially by refl. The second premiss is Γ ` [t := 0]t :=
d;x := sln;x′ := f ; t′ := 1 ≤[ ] t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψd and by 〈[: =]〉I and t /∈ FV(d) suffices to
show (2) Γ, t = 0 ` t := d;x := sln;x′ := f ≤[ ] t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψd. By cutting in (D1)
suffices to show Γ, t = 0, d ≥ 0 ` t := d;x := sln;x′ := f ; t′ := 1 ≤[ ] t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψd.
By SOL suffices to show Γ ` [t := ∗; ?0 ≤ t ≤ d;x := sln]ψ which follows from (D2) be-
cause by expanding defined syntax, have Γ ` ([r := ∗; ?0 ≤ r ≤ d; t := r;x := sln]ψ) and
by renaming have Γ ` ([t := ∗; ?0 ≤ t ≤ d; t := t;x := sln]ψ) which cancels (:=nop) to Γ `
([t := ∗; ?0 ≤ t ≤ d;x := sln]ψ) since sln is the solution by side condition. This completes the
second premiss.
The third premiss is Γ ` [t := 0][t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψd](LmodM ≤[ ] L). The IH gives (IH)
Γt0t x0x , t = d, x = sln, x′ = f ` LmodM ≤[ ] L. The third premiss follows immediately by [′],
reusing d, sol, and dom.
We now give the Demon cases.
Case [∪]I
{{α ∪ β};L}mod (M,N) = {α;L}modM ∪ {β;L}modN
By ;dr and trans it suffices to show
{α;L}modM ∪ {β;L}modN ≤[ ] {{α;L} ∪ {β;L}}
By [∪]R it suffices to show (L) {α;L}modM ∪{β;L}modN ≤[ ] α;L and (R) {α;L}modM ∪
{β;L}modN ≤[ ] β;L.
The IH on α gives Γ ` {α;L} mod M ≤[ ] α;L, then [∪]L1 gives {α;L} mod M ∪
{β;L}modN ≤[ ] {α;L}modM, proving (L) by trans.
The IH on β gives Γ ` {β;L} mod N ≤[ ] α;L, then [∪]L2 gives {α;L} mod M ∪
{β;L}modN ≤[ ] {β;L}modN, proving (R) by trans.
Case [?]I
{?ψ;L}mod (λp : ψ. M) =?ψ; {LmodM}
By ;S on system ?ψ it suffices to show Γ `?ψ ≤[ ]?ψ (which holds immediately by refl) and
Γ ` [?ψ](L modM ≤[ ] L) which follows by [?]I from the IH on L, i.e., from Γ, p : ψ `
LmodM ≤[ ] M , since x0 was arbitrary.
Case [:∗]
{x := ∗;L}mod (λx : R. M) = x := ∗; {LmodM}
By ;S on system x := ∗ it suffices to show Γ ` x := ∗ ≤[ ] x := ∗ (which holds immediately
by refl) and Γ ` [x := ∗](LmodM ≤[ ] L) which follows by [:∗] from the IH on L, i.e., from
Γx0x ` LmodM ≤[ ] M .
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Case [∗]r
{α∗;L}mod (M,N) = LmodM ∪ {α;α∗;L}modN
By rolll, ;dr, and trans it suffices to show
Γ ` LmodM ∪ {α;α∗;L}modN ≤[ ]?tt ∪ {α;α∗};L
By [∪]R it suffices to show (L) LmodM ∪ {α;α∗;L}modN ≤[ ] L and (R) {LmodM ∪
{α;α∗;L}modN} ≤[ ] {α;α∗;L}.
By inversion have Γ ` [L]φ and Γ ` [α;α∗;L]φ, so by the IH have (0) Γ ` LmodM ≤[ ] L
and (1) Γ ` {α;α∗;L}modN ≤[ ] {α;α∗;L}modN
From (0) then [∪]L1 gives L modM ∪ {α;α∗;L} mod N ≤[ ] L modM, proving (L) by
trans.
From (1) then [∪]L2 gives L modM ∪ {α;α∗;L} mod N ≤[ ] {α;α∗;L} mod N, proving
(R) by trans.
Case [∗]I
{α∗d;L}modA rep p : J. B in C = {αmodB}∗; {Lmod C}
By ;S on system {αmodB}∗, suffices to show (L) Γ ` {αmodB}∗ ≤[ ] α∗ (R) Γ `
[{αmodB}∗](LmodC ≤[ ] L). To show (L), apply un∗ and show its premiss Γ ` [αmodB](αmodB ≤[ ]
α). Show this by [∗]I with invariant J . The base case and inductive case are respectively by
(A) and Theorem9 on (B), giving J ` [αmodB]J . The post-case J ` αmodB ≤[ ] α is the
IH on (B).
To show (R), apply the IH on (C) to get J ` L mod C ≤[ ] L. Then apply [∗]I with
invariant J . The base case is (A) and the inductive step is by Theorem9 on (B), giving
J ` [αmodB]J . The post-case J ` Lmod C ≤[ ] L is (C).
Case DC
{x′ = f &φ;L}modDC(Show : ψ,Use) = {{x′ = f &φ ∧ ψ;L}modUse}
By inversion on DC proof have Γ ` Show : [x′ = f &φ]ψ so by DC (0) have (x′ = f &φ) ∼=
(x′ = f &φ∧ψ). By IH have Γ ` {x′ = f &φ ∧ ψ;L}modUse ≤[ ] x′ = f &φ∧ψ;L so by trans
it suffices to show Γ ` x′ = f &φ∧ψ;L ≤[ ] x′ = f &φ;L and by ;S on system x′ = f &φ∧ψ it
suffices to show (L) Γ ` x′ = f &φ∧ψ ≤[ ] x′ = f &φ and (R) Γ ` [x′ = f &φ ∧ ψ](L ≤[ ] L).
Premiss (L) follows from DC applied to fact (0). Premiss (R) follows by refl under an
application of M on (Use).
Case DW
{x′ = f &ψ;L}modDW (M) = {x := ∗;x′ := f ; ?ψ; {LmodM}}
From DW proof have (0) ψ `M : [L]φ. By IH have (1) ψ ` LmodM ≤[ ] L. It suffices by trans
to show (L) Γ ` x := ∗;x′ := f ; ?ψ ≤[ ] x′ = f &ψ and (R) Γ ` [x := ∗;x′ := f ; ?ψ](LmodM ≤[ ]
L). Premiss (L) is by DW. Premiss (R) follows from (1) by M and because Γ ` [x := ∗;x′ := f ; ?ψ]ψ
by 〈[;]〉I, 〈:∗〉I, 〈[: =]〉I, 〈?〉I, and hyp.
Case DG
{x′ = f &ψ; y := ∗; y′ := ∗d;L}modDG(f0, a, b,Post) =
y := f0; {{x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L}mod Post}
XX:38 Refining Constructive Hybrid Games
We prove the case by transitivity trans
y := f0; {{x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L}mod Post} (2)
≤[ ]y := f0; {x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L} (3)
≤[ ]{y := f0;x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ};L (4)
≤[ ]{x′ = f &ψ; {y := ∗; y′ := ∗}d};L (5)
≤[ ]x′ = f &ψ; {y := ∗; y′ := ∗}d;L (6)
Step (3) follows from ;S on system y := f0 and the IH on Post. By inversion Γ, y =
f0 ` Post : [x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L]φ with side condition that y is fresh (including
y /∈ FV(f0), so by IH have Γ, y = f0 ` {x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L} mod Post ≤[ ]
x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L. The first premiss of ;S is Γ ` y := f0 ≤[ ] y := f0 which
holds by refl. The second premiss is
Γ ` [{x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L}mod Post]x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ;L
which follows from the IH by 〈[: =]〉I and the freshness condition on y. Steps (4) and (6) hold by
;A. Step (5) holds by trans. The first premiss Γ ` {y := f0; {x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ}} ≤[ ]
{x′ = f &ψ; y := ∗; y′ := ∗d} holds by DG. The second premiss
Γ ` [y := f0;x′ = f, y′ = a(x)y + b(x) &ψ](L ≤[ ] L)
holds by 〈[;]〉I, 〈[: =]〉I, DW, and refl.
Case [′] In this case the refinement is
{t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ;L}modDS(sol, λd dom. Post) =
t := 0; t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ; {Lmod Post}
The proof starts with applying ;S twice on systems t := 0 and t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ. The first pre-
miss proves trivially t := 0 ≤[ ] t := 0 by refl. Second premiss is Γ ` [t := 0](t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ ≤[ ]
t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ) which also proves trivially by refl. The third premiss is
Γ ` [t := 0][t′ = 1, x′ = f &ψ]LmodM ≤[ ] L
The IH gives (IH) Γt0t x0x , t ≥ 0,∀s : [0, t] [t := s]ψ, x = sln, x′ = f ` L modM ≤[ ] L. The
third premiss follows immediately by [′], reusing sol. J
